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THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ON GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION
By S. A. TACON*
A.

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the genius of the common law lies in its flexibility,
its ability to adapt traditional concepts and doctrines to the needs of a changed
environment. Cynics perhaps would rephrase the adage to read that the
genius of the common law lies in its ability to survive as a powerful force in
society despite radical socio-economic changes. That is, the common law has
'adapted' only after conducting a fierce rearguard action in defending outmoded doctrines and in the face of a clear threat to its existence, namely, replacement of the common law by statute. Nowhere is the cynic's view more
decidely supported than in the field of labour relations.
It is overly simplistic and probably unfair to depict the judiciary of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a last bastion of defence of the
laissez-faire economy. Nonetheless, the common law did respond to the tremendous changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution by repressing attempts
to alter the status quo. The efforts of trade unions, through collective bargaining, to effect a redistribution of wealth and power in employer-employee
relations were definitely hampered by the wide application of tort doctrines,
such as conspiracy and inducing breach of contract.
Furthermore, the courts refused to recognize the realities of the growth
of trade unions and their place in society. Contractual concepts of privity and
intention to create legal obligations continued in their historic form and,
thereby, emasculated the collective agreement. This attitude was crystallized
in the case of Young v. CanadianNorthern Railway' in which the court ruled
that collective agreements created obligations which were legally unenforceable; the appropriate means of redress was to be the calling of a strike.
Strikes and lockouts, however, were and are a notoriously inefficient
means of dispute settlement, enormously costly to both employer and employee. As the judiciary obviously regarded the emerging labour relations
field as a pariah in the traditional legal system, the trade unions and employers turned to an alternative formula to resolve disputes arising during the
term of the collective agreement, namely, consensual arbitration. To be sure,
arbitrators borrowed heavily from existing legal doctrines, often by analogy,
to fashion remedies appropriate to the industrial setting. Nevertheless, an ar© Copyright, 1976, S. A. Tacon.
* Ms. Tacon (formerly Bellan) is an LL.M. candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University.
1 (1931), 1 D.L.R. 645 (P.C.).
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bitral jurisprudence did develop, insulated from judicial interference by the
judiciary's own reticence vis a vis a collective bargaining regime.2
Faced with the hostility of the common law, trade unions turned to the
legislatures for legitimization and protection. Through amendments to the
Criminal Code removing criminal liability for union activities, and through
positive statutory enactments, 3 the legislature has responded by institutionalizing the collective bargaining process.
While industrial peace has obviously become a major governmental
policy objective, The Labour Relations Act of Ontario (OLRA) also specifies
the means to this end:
Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding settlement by
arbitration, without stoppage of work, of all differences between the parties arising
from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged violation of the
agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable 4

Thus, the arbitration system likewise found favour with the legislators as the
most appropriate means of enforcing a collective agreement.
The courts were now confronted with a respectable institution rather
than a ragtag assortment of ruffians spouting heretical economic doctrines. 5
Here the genius, or opportunism, of the common law surfaced. The judiciary
seized upon the OLRA requirement of an arbitration clause in collective
agreements to characterize arbitration boards as statutory tribunals, implicitly
inferior to the extant court structure, and thereby subject to judicial review.
Much has been made of the distinction between judicial review and appellate jurisdiction. In theory, the latter permits full examination of the legal
reasoning of the inferior court with corresponding authority to correct errors
and substitute the 'right' decision. Judicial review, however, is to be confined
to the prerogative writs of certiorari,mandamus, prohibition, and has now
been simplified procedurally in Ontario by a single application for judicial
review which includes the remedies of all the prerogative writs. 6 Even a cursory glance at the instances of judicial review of arbitration boards, however,
reveals the semantic nature of the distinction; it is all too easy and tempting
to cast intervention by an appellate body as a review for "excess of jurisdiction."7 Already familiar with a judicial hierarchy, the courts would not or
2 See, A. W. Carrothers, Labour Arbitration in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths,
1961) at 17. The author concludes, however, that the new "industrial" jurisprudence
is far from fully developed.
3 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907, 6-7 Edw. VII, c. 20.
4 R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 37(1); as amended by S.O. 1975, c. 76, s. 37.
5 For the influence of communism and socialism on the development of the trade
union movement, see, Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour; the
C.1.O., the Communist Party and the CanadianCongress of Labour, 1935-1956 (Toronto:
U. of T. Press, 1973) and Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada, 1827-1959
(Montreal: Can. Social Publications, 1966).
0 The Judicial Review ProceduresAct, A.S.O. 1971, c. 48.
7 See, Jarvisv. Associated Medical Services Inc. et al., [1964] S.C.R. 497; 44 D.L.R.
(2d) 407; R. v. Arthurs, Ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co., [1969] S.C.R. 85;
(1969), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 693.
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could not countenance a sovereign jurisdiction in arbitration boards within
the field of collective agreement disputes.
It is suggested that this incorporation of arbitration boards into the hierarchical structure of the regular court system is inimical to the development of
a fully adumbrated body of industrial jurisprudence and, consequently, injurious to the "harmonious relations between employers and employees."
The essence of arbitration is the impartiality of the arbitrator (in the
sense of being free from bias), tempered with the acceptability, to the immediate parties, of both the arbitrator himself and his award.8 The jurisdiction
of the arbitrator is founded on the consent of the parties, and he is directly
accountable to them; his continued employment depends upon his reaching
viable solutions or compromises in the instant dispute which do not alienate
either party. While this feature of arbitration has been criticized as a weakness
of the system,9 it actually represents the touchstone of arbitration.1 0
The remedies utilized by the courts and arbitrators also indicate the
differing nature of the two processes. The judiciary has always stressed money
damages as its primary form of relief, although equitable remedies have been
available in certain circumstances. Specific performance of a contract of employment, however, has traditionally been refused on the ground that it is
odious to one's sense of decency to compel an individual to employ or be
employed by another against his will. Arbitration awards, however, are replete with instances of specific performance, i.e., where the grievor is reinstated on terms specified by the award. The amount of compensation due in
such cases is frequently left for determination by the parties, unlike courtdictated damages.
Finally, the courts represent an intensely individualistic proceeding, albeit
the public interest influences some decisions. Labour arbitration is much
more a group process, involving a collection of individuals constituting the
employer (seldom is the employer a single individual) and a corresponding
collection of individuals constituting the union. Although numerous grievances are brought on behalf of individual employees, many comprise group,
union, or policy grievances dealing with a broader range of issues. Also, it is
important to note that the individual grievance is conducted on behalf of the
employee by the union."
Several standard arguments commending arbitration over the judicial
process in the field of labour relations deserve brief mention: the expertise resulting from constant contact with labour problems; the informality and flex8Arthurs, The Three Faces of Justice

-

Bias in the Tripartite Tribunal (1963),

28 Sask. Bar Rev. 147.
9 Hayes, Labour Arbitration: A Dissenting View (1966).

10 The Ministerial criteria for the appointment of arbitrators under s. 37(4) of the
OLRA stresses the necessity for the mutual acceptability of such arbitration in this
essentially 'private' process.

11 It is not within the scope of this paper to deal extensively with the duty of fair
representation or the right of an individual to conduct his own grievance despite union
opposition. See, generally, Palaire, Tilting Against the Windmill: The Individual's Right
to Arbitration (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L. J. 485.
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ibility of arbitration; the lack of stare decisis as an operative principle; the
relative speed in handling grievances.
These distinctions have been drawn before but merit repetition if only to
emphasize the obvious: arbitration boards and the courts perform different
functions and fulfill differing needs for different communities. Each possesses
a distinct jurisprudence. And in each, "the law" is a dynamic and evolutionary, rather than static, process.
Canada has prided itself on its tolerance of difference. Unfortunately,
this tolerance has not been characteristic of the judiciary in its treatment of
arbitration tribunals. This is doubly unfortunate since the seeds of pluralism in
our legal system were sown early in Canadian history and reaffirmed in the
British North America Act itself.12 Clearly, the effect of the Act was to permit
uniformity where desired in the common law provinces but the continuation of
the civil law system in Quebec. And today, the Supreme Court of Canada
determines appeals from the Province of Quebec according to the Civil Code.
The courts could review arbitration awards employing arbitral jurisprudence
rather than common law principles. This would preserve the judicial hierarchy
intact while respecting the integrity of the arbitration process. In conflict of
laws terminology, the courts would apply the "proper law" of the contract,
i.e., industrial law, and ignore the substantive rules of the forum.Y3
Judicial review is, however, not simply a vertical process. Arbitrators
cannot fail to be affected by the courts' treatment of their decisions. And,
while arbitral awards are not binding inter se, stare decisis theoretically
should apply for judicial decisions in respect of later arbitrations. Given the
current stance of the judiciary, it falls to the arbitrator to integrate the dicta
of the courts and arbitral jurisprudence so as to preserve industrial law as
intact as possible.
In three important instances, the decision of an arbitrator was reversed
by the Supreme Court of Canada or the Ontario Court of Appeal: Re Port
ArthurShipbuilding Co.,14 Re Hoogendoornand GreeningMetal Productsand
Screening Equipment Co.,'6 Re General Truckdriver's Union, Local 938 v.
Hoar Transport Co. Ltd.' 6 In each case, the arbitrator's reasoning had bal-

anced staid common law notions of contract with an awareness of the dynamics of the labour relations field. And, in each instance, the higher court dis12
13

(1867), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, ss. 94 and 129.
Arthurs, Developing Industrial Citizenship (1963), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 786 at 828-

29.
14 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 109; quashed (1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 214 (Ont. H.C.);
rev'd. (1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. C.A.); [1969] S.C.R. 85; (1969), 70 D.L.R.
(2d) 693.
15 [1968] S.C.R. 30; (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641; rev'd [1967] 1 O.R. 712; 62 D.L.R.
(2d) 167 (Ont. C.A.); [1967] C.C.L. 237, which aff'd, subject to a variation, [1966]
2 O.R. 746; 58 D.L.R. (2d) 338.
10 [1968] S.C.R. 634; 4 D.L.R. (3d) 449; aff'g, [1968] 1 O.R. 705; 67 D.L.R. (2d)
484. (sub nom. R. v. Weiler, ex parte Hoar Transport Co.) which rev'd, [1967] 2 O.R.
554; 64 D.L.R. (2d) 400; [1967] C.C.L. 1370.
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carded the arbitrator's ratio as unsound, and affirmed the paramountcy of
the common law doctrine.
B.

PORT ARTHUR SHIPBUILDING: THE REMEDIAL AUTHORITY
OF THE ARBITRATOR

The Legislature affirmed the use of consensual arbitration for resolution
of disputes arising under the collective agreement by empowering arbitrators
to reach a "final and binding" determination of differences in s. 37 of the
OLRA. Yet, collective agreements invariably contain a clause to the effect
that the arbitrator may not "amend, alter or modify" the terms of the agreement. The question, then, becomes: what is the reach of this restriction on the
arbitrator's power in the collective agreement in the face of the mandate from
the parties and the legislature to adjudicate the dispute? That is, what is the
nature and source of the authority of the arbitrator to resolve differences
between the parties?
1.

Polymer: The Basis of Arbitral Authority

The arbitration award in Port Arthur was handed down in June, 1966.
But the reasoning in that case had its origins several years earlier in the arbi
tral decision of Professor Laskin in Re Polymer Corp. Ltd. and Oil, Chemical
7
and Atomic Workers.'
In Polymer, the company sought a declaration that the union had engaged in an illegal strike and claimed damages for losses suffered. The arbitrator upheld the company's position and awarded damages; the decision was
affirmed at all levels of appeal. But in reaching this conclusion, Professor
Laskin analysed the function of arbitration and argued that that functional

basis had specific implications for the nature of arbitral authority:
As a matter of history, collective agreements in Canada had no legal force in their
own right until the advent of collective bargaining legislation. Our Courts refused
to assume original jurisdiction for their enforcement and placed them outside the
legal framework within which contractual obligations of individuals were administered. The legislation; which in the context of encouragement to collective bargaining sought stability in employer-employee relations, envisaged arbitration
through a mutually accepted tribunal as a built-in device for ensuring the realization of the rights and enforcement of the obligations which were the products
of successful negotiation. Original jurisdiction without right of appeal was vested
in boards of arbitration under legislative and consensual prescriptions for finality
and for binding determinations.' 8

The jurisdiction of the arbitrator to resolve disputes arising under the col-

lective agreement was to be distinguished from the power or authority of the
arbitrator to devise an award which did, in fact, resolve such disputes. "Effective adjudication" was predicated upon remedial as well as declaratory
authority in the arbitrator. In Polymer, it was found that the innocent party
would only be vindicated by an award of damages; absent arbitral authority
17 (1959), 10 L.A.C. 51.
38

Id. at 55-56.
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to so award, the legislative scheme for dispute settlement in a collective bargaining regime would become an "empty vehicle."
Once the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of a board of arbitration
authorized to adjudicate on an alleged violation of a collective agreement obligation, they have accepted the full range of the tribunal's adjudicative powers (unless
expressly limited) which is immanent in such adjudication. To seek to thwart
their exercise by appeal to a fictional intention of the parties is to seek indirectly
to nullify the duty of observance and performance of collective agreement terms.' 9
Although the damage award was upheld, and the Ontario Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the reasoning of McRuer,
C.J.H.C. in the Ontario High Court,20 the judiciary though, did not endorse
the arbitrator's characterization of the basis for arbitral authority. Rather,
"the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to award damages must be found
in the
'2 1
language used by the parties as an expression of their 'intention'."
Although such power was not explicitly granted to the arbitrator in the
collective agreement in question, the Courts found such an implication from

the broad language regarding the disposition of grievances, and from the statutory obligation to settle all differences without stoppage of work.m2 Thus,
the extent of arbitral remedial authority was considered a question of jurisdiction to be determined according to the intention of the parties as expressed or
implied by the language of the collective agreement.
The arbitrator and the Courts, therefore, clearly differed in their views of
the nature of the remedial authority of arbitrators. But they concurred in the
result in Polymer, and the Courts failed to openly disapprove of the arbitrator's reasoning. Arbitrators, then, in subsequent grievances could freely rely
on Professor Laskin's analysis in Polymer in the absence of express provision
23
in the collective agreement.

2.

The Exercise of Remedial Authority Before Port Arthur

The consensus among arbitrators seemed to favour the Polymer view that
the arbitrator's authority stemmed from the collective bargaining regime itself.2 4 In the words of Professor Krever in Re The Canadian Salt Co. Ltd.,
19 Id. at 60.
20 [1961] O.R. 438; 28 D.L.R. (2d) 81; aff'g, [1961] O.R. 176; 26 D.L.R. (2d) 609.

Afl'd (sub. nom. Imbleau v. Laskin), [1962] S.C.R. 338; (sub. nom. Re Polymer Corp.
and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union Local 164, 33 D.L.R. (2d) 124.
2
1 Per McRuer, C.J.H.C., (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 609 at 614.
22 Id. at 614-15.
23
See, Re Harding Carpets Limited (1963), 14 L.A.C. 93 (Hanrahan). But, as is
indicated infra, prior to Port Arthur, arbitral consensus supported the exercise of remedial authority in discipline grievances irrespective of the terminology of the collective
agreement.
24 Itmust be stressed that arbitral consensus as to the source and nature of arbitral
authority long pre-dated Polymer, although the examples cited are restricted to the
mid-1960's. Generally, see, Re Massey-Harris-Ferguson Ltd. (1958), 8 L.A.C. 256
(Cross); Re Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. (Peterboro) (1949), 1 L.A.C. 320
(Laskin); Re Sandwich Windsor & Amherstberg Ry. (1950), 2 L.A.C. 684 (Hanrahan);
Re PeterboroLock Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1952), 3 L.A.C. 935 (Lang).
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"The right of an employee to grieve is sufficient to extend jurisdiction to an
arbitrator to consider the severity of a suspension and to change the penalty
imposed by the company even when the agreement contains a 'no power to
amend, alter, or add to' clause. '25 The arbitrator was seen to possess broad
powers of review of the discipline imposed by the employer.
The emphasis in the arbitral judgments lay not on the issue of remedial
authority itself, but on the fashioning of guidelines for the exercise of such
powers. For example, demotion was deemed to be an improper disciplinary
measure; an employee could only be demoted for his inability to perform his
tasks efficiently or in a general reduction of the work force as permitted by
the collective agreement.2 6 In Re Tecunseh Products of Canada,2 7 the arbitrator substituted a two day suspension for insubordination, overturning an
improper demotion. Likewise, the elimination of seniority rights was not justified, although a six day suspension was warranted for a three day absence
without leave in Re Wickett & Craig Ltd.28 While the collective agreement
provided for automatic loss of seniority upon absence without leave for more
than two days, given the proven illness of the grievor as the reason for such
absence, a literal application of the collective agreement was rejected as too
drastic a consequence for the breach of duty in question. 29
Further, it was not considered a proper use of management's powers
to mete out discipline in an arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory manner.
For example, the grievors were reinstated in Re Long Sault Yarns Ltd.,30
as the company had unreasonably selected these employees for discharge
after a wildcat strike without regard to their degree of guilt relative to the
other employees participating or among the grievors themselves. To quote
the arbitrator in Re Findlays Ltd., "The concept of non-discrimination involved treating employees who are something less than equal in such a way
that the difference in treatment that they receive bears a reasonable relationship to differences in their performance."' 31 In assessing appropriate penalties,
the arbitrator was to consider not just the specific grievance, but also the
broader role of discipline in the collective bargaining regime:
The singling out of the grievor for this type of penalty while other tardy em-

ployees were not warned or otherwise penalized, was apt to create a harmful
employer-employee relationship, and the imposition of disciplinary penalties in
industry is a quasi-judicial function such that justice must not only be done, but
32
must appear to be done.
25 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 322 at 322.

26 Re Central Supermarkets Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 332 (Arrell); Re Findlays Ltd.

(1968), 19 L.A.C. 364 (Christie).
27

(1968), 19 L.A.C. 180 (Weatherill).

(1968), 19 L.A.C. 310 (Weatherill).
Id. at 310-11.
30 (1968), 19 L.A.C. 257 (Curtis).
31 (1968), 19 L.A.C. 364 at 364. That case dealt with discriminatory demotion
rather than discriminatory discipline per se but the principle formulated applies in both
instances.
2 Re Thibodeau Express Ltd. (1966), 18 L.A.C. 28 (Hanrahan), where a three-day
suspension was reduced to one day; on the facts the grievor had a record for tardiness
but was only one minute late on the day in question.
28
29
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There seemed to be considerable agreement on the test to be applied:
the discipline must be "within the range of reasonable responses to the situation."' 33 That is, the arbitrator must look to the discipline imposed in the light
of all the circumstances of the case.3 4 However, only in Re Concrete Pipe was
there any reference to the collective agreement's expressly conferring on the
arbitrator the right to vary a penalty imposed by the company.3 5
Arbitrators, then, came to exercise remedial authority according to
definite principles, but irrespective of express mandate in the collective agreement to modify the discipline imposed by the employer,
and usually in the
36
face of a standard "no alter, amend or modify" clause.
3.

The Rule in Port Arthur
There was no dispute as to the facts in Port Arthur: three employees had
taken unauthorized leaves of absence, accepting temporary employment elsewhere, and had been discharged. The collective agreement contained a "just
cause" provision governing dismissal, and the usual "no alter, amend or
modify" clause. The arbitrator rejected the common law rules of the masterservant relationship as inappropriate in the context of a collective bargaining
regime in which collective agreements shelter employees from termination
except for "just cause". Instead of the common law rule of employment terminable virtually at the will of the employer, arbitrators had fleshed out the
concept of "just cause":
It is common knowledge that over the years a distinctive body of arbitral jurisprudence has developed to give meaning to the concept of 'just cause' for discharge in the context of modern industrial employment. Although the common
law may provide guidance, useful analogies, even general principles, the umbilical
cord has been severed and37the new doctrines of labour arbitrators have begun
to lead a life of their own.

For arbitral jurisprudence, the issue was formulated by Arbitrator
33

Re InternationalHarvester Co. of Canada,Ltd. (1967), 18 L.A.C. 237 (Weath-

erill).
34 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 408 (Reville). For examples of the application of this test,
see, Re Slater Steel Industries Ltd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 110 (Palmer); Re C.N.R. Co.,
Hotel Department (1968), 19 L.A.C. 401 (Hanrahan); Re Phillips Cables Ltd. (1968),
19 L.A.C. 274 (O'Shea); Re Precision Products Canada Ltd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 406
(Weatherill).
sr (1966), 17 L.A.C. 419 (Hanrahan).
80 The case of Re Canadian Gypsum Ltd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 341 (Weler) does
not really dissent from this view. Rather, the collective agreement in question did not
provide for any review of company discipline action, i.e., there was no "just cause"
limitation. The arbitrator refused to imply such a provision solely from the existence
of the collective agreement.
37 Re Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 109 (Arthurs) at 112. It
should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada recently held that the common law
contract doctrine of fundamental breach is inapplicable to a collective bargaining regime.
In McGavin ToastmasterLtd. v. Ainscough et al. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1, the Supreme
Court of Canada refused to treat an unlawful strike by the employees as a repudiation
of their contract of employment; the company remained liable to those employees for
severance pay on the closing down of the plant as required by the terms of the collective agreement.
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Arthurs as: "To find 'just' cause for discharge we must have regard both to the
offence and to the penalty." 8 Despite the acknowledged serious nature of the
incident, given the considerable seniority of the grievors, their excellent
work record, and the minimal likelihood of repetition of such behaviour, the
arbitrator found that the discharge was not for proper cause. 9
In formulating the issue as he did, the arbitrator was relying on established industrial jurisprudence. Re KVP Co. Ltd. had settled the arbitral law
regarding discipline:
The prevailing rule now appears to be established that when the question arises
whether or not the penalty was for just cause, the company must establish just
cause not only for the imposition of a penalty but for the particular penalty imposed. 4 0

Then, citing Polymer for the proposition that "the arbitrator may fashion
appropriate remedies pursuant to his general mandate to make a final and
binding determination of the issues presented to him", 41 the arbitrator reinstated the grievors but imposed lengthy suspensions.
The majority in the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the award, essentially adopting the arbitrator's reasoning:
It cannot be the case (although there was some suggestion of this in argument)
that the company's judgment that the dereliction of the employees merited discharge was beyond review by the arbitration board. This would empty an arbitration board's function in discharge cases of any substance once misconduct was
42
proven. The collective agreement clearly makes 'proper cause' an arbitrable issue.

as Re Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co., id. at 113.
39 In the lower court, there was an attempt to distinguish "proper" and "just" cause,
but this argument was rejected as merely semantic in the Appeal Court, where the
words were treated as synonymous. It must be stressed that the arbitrator in Port Arthur
found, as a matter of arbitral law, that there was no "just cause" for discharge. The
case of R. v. Bigelow, Ex. p. International Nickel Co., [1959] O.R. 527 was, therefore,
clearly distinguished. There the arbitrator had reinstated the grievor subject to a suspension to the date of the award due to mitigating factors. But rather than citing the
"other circumstances" as going to the "justness" of the discipline, i.e., whether the penalty
imposed was proper in the context, the arbitrator held that "just cause" for discharge
did exist; his attempt to alleviate the penalty was quashed in the Ontario Court of
Appeal as an excess of jurisdiction. The argument is not merely semantic: when the
collective agreement stipulates that just cause for discipline must be shown, a finding
of just cause necessitates the dismissal of the grievance. In Port Arthur, however, the
term in the collective agreement requiring proper cause for discharge had not been
satisfied.
40 (1965), 16 L.A.C. 73 (Robinson) at 96. This principle was derived from dicta
in preceding arbitrations, particularly, Re Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. (1954),
5 L.A.C. 139 (Laskin); Re Dow Kingsbeer Brewery Ltd. (1960), 11 L.A.C. 129
(Cross); Re CanadianFood Products Sales Ltd. (1965), 15 L.A.C. 443 (Reville); and
Re Teskey Ready-Mix Ltd. (1963), 14 L.A.C. 136 (Hanrahan).
41 Supra, note 33 at 113.
42
R. v. Arthurs, Ex p. Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. (1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 342
at 360. It should be noted that the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal was relied
on in Re Sentry Department Stores Ltd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 378 (Hanrahan) to justify
substitution of a two-week suspension in lieu of dismissal where the collective agreement
was silent as to the arbitrator's authority to modify the decision imposed.
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To use the phraseology of Polymer, the board had jurisdiction to review
company's action by virtue of the proper cause provision and had the power
to fashion an appropriate remedy in order to fulfill the statutory and contractual mandate to render a final and binding determination of the dispute
where the company's response was found to be improper.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the company's position was
vindicated and the award quashed. The Court, as in Polymer, treated the issue as going to jurisdiction:
The task of the board of arbitration in this case was to determine whether there
was proper cause. The findings of fact actually made and the only findings of fact
that the board could possibly make establish that there was proper cause. Then
there was only one proper legal conclusion, namely, that the employees had given
the management proper cause for dismissal . . . Once the board had found that
there were facts justifying discipline, the particular form chosen was not subject
to review on arbitration. 43

The Court did not deal explicitly with the argument raised by Laskin, J.A.
(as he then was) in the Ontario Court of Appeal (nor with his earlier analysis
in Polymer) that the statutory requirement of arbitration to reach a final and
binding adjudication of disputes necessarily implies a remedial authority for
arbitrators. Further, the Court ignored precedents4 4 referred to by the arbitrator on discipline clauses in the industrial context. Although arbitration
boards were deemed statutory tribunals and thereby subject to judicial review
by virtue of the OLRA, the authority of the arbitrator, in the Court's view,
was delimited solely by the words of the collective agreement in question. The
rule in Port Arthur was straight-forward:
An arbitration board of the type under consideration has no inherent powers of
review similar to those of the Courts. Its only powers are those conferred upon
it by the collective agreement and these are usually defined in some detail. It has
no inherent powers to amend, modify or ignore the collective agreement.45

4.

The Response of the Arbitrators:Obedience
It is fair to state that the arbitrators were surprised by the dicta in Port
Arthur: the Court had completely rejected as unsound what was accepted
arbitral practice, namely, the right of arbitrators to modify penalties where
the discipline was felt excessive.
One response was unquestioning obedience to the rule in Port Arthur
without any attempt to mitigate against the harshness of the doctrine in the
particular circumstances. For example, in Re Northern Telephone, the grievors had refused to reside in unsanitary living quarters; when denied permission to sleep in the trucks, they had returned home. The company's allegation
of a "voluntary quit" was rejected by the arbitrator on the facts. However, as
the employees were not entirely innocent, the discharges were upheld:
Clearly, the grievors had left themselves open to some disciplinary action and,
43 Port Arthur Shipbuilding v. Arthurs et al. (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 693 (S.C.C.)
at 696.
44 Re KVP Co. Ltd., supra, note 40 and cases cited therein at 96-97.
45
Supra, note 43 at 702.
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by virtue of the holding in the Port Arthur Shipbuilding case, this board cannot
question, in the words of Judson, J. 'the particular form chosen'. 46

In Re Dupont of CanadaLtd.,47 the dismissal of an employee who engaged in
horseplay contrary to company rules was affirmed. The arbitrator felt the Port
Arthur decision was "on all fours" with the instant grievance; he, therefore,
was without jurisdiction to "substitute" a lesser form of discipline. Again, in
Re Trane Co. of Canada Ltd.,48 the arbitrator held that the rule in Port
Arthur required specific words authorizing a variation of a disciplinary
measure and refused to interfere in the company's choice of penalty (dismissal)
for the grievor's carelessness. 49
Such responses are understandable, perhaps, as an expression of frustration at the Court's intervention with a functioning system of resolving disputes, but did little to alleviate an unjust penalty imposed on the grievor.
While arbitrators may also have been motivated by fidelity to judicial pronouncements under the principle of stare decisis, there was now enthusiastic
approval among arbitrators of the dicta in Port Arthur.
It should be noted that one probable consequence of Port Arthur was
the inclusion in collective agreements of a specific provision authorizing the
arbitrator to modify any disciplinary penalty imposed by the company.
Whereas prior to the Court's ruling only the rare case made mention of such
a provision, the arbitrators in a number of the unreported decisions in 1970,
before the enactment of the legislative amendment which gave the arbitrator
authority to substitute a penalty, referred to such clauses as grounding their
authority to vary penalties. 50 But, of course, the union would have to bargain away some other advantage to obtain the acquiescence of the company
to include such a provision in the collective agreement. In one reported
decision, Re Stancor Central Ltd.,51 the arbitrator relied on a clause authorizing him to reach a "just and equitable result" in order to reinstate the grievor
subject to a one day suspension; the clause was deemed sufficiently specific
authorization to override the rule in Port Arthur. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. McCullogh, Ex. P. Dowty Equipment of Canada Ltd. held that
a collective agreement permitting the arbitration board to review the discharge
and confirm the dismissal, reinstate the grievor with compensation or reach
46 (1968), 19 L.A.C. 129 (Palmer) at 136.

47 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 37 (Lane).
48 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 107 (Palmer).
49
Additional cases illustrating this approach include Re Kysor of Ridgetown Ltd.
(1970), 22 L.A.C. 23 (Hinnegan); Re Dunham-Bush of Canada Ltd. (1970), 22 L.A.C.
46 (Hinnegan); Re Dupont of CanadaLtd. (1970), 21 L.A.C. 376 (Brown); Re Pamour
Porcupine Mines Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 321 (Godin); Re Dominion Tape of Canada
Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Brandt); Re F. W. FearmanCo. Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Palmer).
50
Re Hyde Spring & Wire (Canada)Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Brown); Re Canadian
Carborundum Co. Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Roberts); Re Gibson Cartage Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Brown); Re Rubbermaid (Canada)Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Weiler); Re
Loblaw Groceteria Co. Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Brown); Re Massey-Ferguson Industries
Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Johnston); Re Massey-Ferguson Industries Ltd., unreported,
1970 (Weatherill); Re Jockey Club Limited, unreported, 1970 (Simmons).
51 (1970), 22 L.A.C. 184 (Weiler).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 14, NO. 3

"any other arrangement which may be deemed just and equitable" was sufficiently precise to authorize the board to substitute a three month suspension
for discharge notwithstanding specificity in the plant rules providing for dismissal for the alleged offence.52
5.

Redefining the Issue to Avoid the Port Arthur Rule

Arbitrators, however, did utilize several arbitral doctrines to limit the
reach of the dicta in Port Arthur and thereby preserve the earlier jurisprudence. One approach was to characterize the issue as other than a matter of
varying the penalty imposed by the company. For example, arbitrators affirmed the earlier principle that innocent absenteeism is not grounds for discipline in the sense of penalizing culpable conduct.m By defining absenteeism
for medical reasons as other than a disciplinary matter, the arbitrator avoided
the imputation that he was modifying a "penalty" imposed by the company."
Discipline for breach of company rules would be upheld only after a
threshold question as to the propriety of the rule itself had been affirmatively
answered. To quote the arbitrator in Re General Spring Products Ltd.,
"Where breach of a rule is relied on as the basis of discipline, the rule
must be consistent with the collective agreement, clear and unequivocal,
known to the employee, consistently enforced and reasonable." 55 To be adjudged "reasonable", the rule must directly relate to matters affecting the
employment relationship itself. In that case, the grievor was convicted for
possession of stolen property and the rules provided for discharge upon proof
of a criminal conviction. But the arbitrator held that, as the rule was unrelated to the grievor's actual job, there was no just cause for discipline. In
restricting management's right to formulate regulations defining culpable activities, arbitrators achieved a prior modification of management's right to impose
discipline. 6
In a similar vein, arbitrators utilized the doctrine of culminating incident: the company could rely on the past work record to satisfy the just cause
standard only if the culminating incident itself was adequately proved to merit
discipline. While the entire record of the grievor may have justified some
discipline (and under PortArthur the arbitrator could not restrict the severity
of the form chosen), in Re Fiberglas Canada Ltd. the culminating incident
5
itself was not proved to warrant discipline and the grievance succeeded. r
(1969), 20.R. 331 at 333.
53 Arbitrators did recognise management's right to terminate the employment of an
individual for excessive absenteeism.
54 See, Re Seiberling Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 267 (Weiler);
Re Power Super Markets (1969), 20 L.A.C. 73 (Krever).
55 (1968), 19 L.A.C. 392 (Weatherill) at 394.
50This approach was followed in Re Brock University (1970), 21 L.A.C. 146
(Brown). Further, in Re National Steel Drum Co. Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 402 (Palmer),
the company rule imposing dismissal in the event of a wage assignment or garnishee
order was considered an inappropriate way of protecting the company's interest; the
grievor was reinstated conditional upon obtaining a consolidation order.
57 (1968), 20L.A.C. 11 (Hanrahan).
52
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Arbitrators seemed to be moving toward the imposition of a duty on the
company to act fairly and reasonably in imposing discipline. For example, in
Re Findlay Foundry Ltd.,58 the arbitrator found that the procedural foundations for such a severe form of discipline as discharge had not been laid.
That is, a general warning that production must increase, without specifying
that dismissal was a possible consequence of non-improvement was insufficient preparation for discharge. In Re Canadian Curtis-Wright Ltd., 9 the
grievor failed to return immediately after completing union business. The
test in Port Arthur was satisfied, i.e., "Could an honest management, looking
at the group of employees as a whole and at the interest of the company,
have reached the conclusion that they did?"6 But the arbitrator held that the
company's "discretion" in selecting the disciplinary response "must be exercised in a judicious fashion after considering the individual employee and
the particular circumstances giving rise to the issue of just cause."' 61
Thus, arbitrators sought to soften the effect of Port Arthur by redefining
the problem from a matter of the measure of discipline, which could not be
altered, to the fulfilling of an arbitrally-imposed condition as a prerequisite to
the valid imposition of discipline. This tactic, however, had a severe limitation.
The arbitrator, in effect, would be relieving the grievor from any penalty
since a more appropriate disciplinary response could not be imposed. The
choice lay between exoneration of the grievor from any wrongdoing and upholding an excessive form of discipline. The case of Re Upper Lakes Shipping
Ltd.6 illustrated the dilemma. The grievor was dismissed for using insolent
language to a superior, contrary to the regulations under the Canada Shipping
Act. The arbitrator held that this was not discharge for just cause. Precluded
from substituting a lesser penalty under the Port Arthur rule, the arbitrator
indicated he was compelled to order full reinstatement with compensation.
The facts of the grievance, therefore, would have to be particularly compelling for the arbitrator to uphold the union's claim.
6.

Attempts to Contain the Rule in Port Arthur
Despite the apparent breadth of the dicta in Port Arthur, arbitrators did
evolve some positive doctrines to alleviate the harshness of the rule. In Re
International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd., the arbitrator acknowledged the
binding effect of PortArthur but rejected the imputation that the issue in discipline grievances was simply whether the company had just cause to impose
any penalty; the language of the case could not be viewed in isolation. In the
words of the arbitrator, "We consider it an unfair gloss on the Court's language to say that proper cause ('in the air', so to speak) is to be, simpliciter,
58 (1970), 22 L.A.C. 48 (Adell).
59 (1970), 21 L.A.C. 404 (Shime).
0
o Supra, note 43 at 697.
61 Supra, note 59 at 408. For further examples, see, Re Rahn Metals Ltd. (1969), 20
L.A.C. 217 (Brown); Re Northern Foodmarts Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 214 (Godin);
Re Douglas Aircraft (1969), 20 L.A.C. 362 (Brown); Re International Nickel Co.
(1969), 20 L.A.C. 288 (Brown).
62 (1969), 20L.A.C. 149 (Weatherill).
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the subject of determination. The cause must be proper or appropriate to the
action taken." 63 Superficially, the arbitrator seemed to defer to the dicta in Port
Arthur. But what was actuaUy accomplished was the replacement of the
Court's test - "Once the board had found that there were facts justifying discipline, the particular form chosen was not subject to review" 64 - with the earlier
arbitral doctrine that the discipline must be commensurate with the offence.
On the facts, the arbitrator found that the two day suspension for refusal to
work in allegedly unsafe conditions was not excessive given the circumstances; the grievance was dismissed. But in reaching that conclusion, the
arbitrator laid down a supposedly alternative formulation of the Port Arthur
rule:
It is not our task to decide what discipline we might have imposed, but only to
it fell within
determine whether the penalty imposed was just; that is, whether
the range of reasonable disciplinary responses to the situation. 65

However, under this doctrine, the arbitrator could again consider such other
factors as provocation, seniority, work record, and the particular circumstances of the incident in assessing the justness of the penalty.
Some arbitral awards cited such mitigating factors to hold that no just
cause for the discipline existed despite some wrongdoing by the grievor. In
Re Hayes-Dana Ltd.,66 the grievor was given an indefinite suspension for
assault and insubordination. The evidence revealed that the foreman's action
provoked an automatic, although violent, response of the employee. It was
held that the foreman was solely responsible for the incident and the grievor was
reinstated with full compensation. In Re Associated Freezers of Canada
Ltd., 7 absence from a work shift without prior notification to the company
resulted in the grievor's discharge. Given the silence of the collective agreement and plant regulations as to whether discharge would result from such
failure, and given the grievor's telephone request of a fellow employee to
notify the foreman, the arbitrator held that just cause for dismissal had not
been established. The grievor was reinstated with compensation. The decision
of Re Baton BroadcastingLtd. likewise required the company to show just
cause for the particular form of discipline selected in light of all the circumstances. Further, "[t]here is an obligation on the company before discharging
an employee to make a proper assessment of all the available evidence and
all the pertinent factors prior to imposing the penalty"; 8 the pre-Port Arthur
award of Re Sperry Gyroscope69 was cited as founding this duty.
In fact, the discipline imposed by the company was modified in several
decisions. In Re Tank Truck Transport Ltd.,70 a unanimous board deter03

Re InternationalNickel Co. of CanadaLtd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 118 (Weatherill)

at 121.
64 Supra, note 43 at 696.

o Supra, note 63 at 124.
00 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 410 (Hanrahan).
07 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 285 (I-anrahan).
08
Unreported, (O'Shea) at 32.
09 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 426 (Hanrahan).
70 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 403 (Hanrahan).
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mined that the grievor's refusal to work in the circumstances could not be
considered insubordination but was deserving of some censure; the five day
suspension was reduced to two and one half days. The arbitrator in Re Union
Carbide CanadaLtd.71 held that the fight for which the grievor was dismissed
neither interrupted production nor tarnished the company's public image.
Further, as the grievor had been seriously provoked, suspension in lieu of
discharge was deemed the proper penalty.
It is unlikely that the collective agreements in such cases authorized such
variation, since they commonly couple a just cause provision with a standard
"no alter, amend or modify" clause, as in Port Arthur itself. Rather, it seems
that the arbitrators either were prepared to risk reversal on judicial review or
had succeeded in rephrasing the Court's dicta to permit such an award. Support for the latter interpretation is found in Re Fabricated Steel Products
(Windsor) Ltd.72 In that case, the arbitrator held that just cause for dismissal
had not been established. But an interesting interpretation was placed on Port
Arthur. There, the Court stated that proper cause for discipline did exist; the
arbitrator was precluded from modifying the penalty. From this, Arbitrator
Weatheril concluded that, where just cause was not established, the arbitrator
could assess "consequential relief." That phrase had been applied in Port
Arthur to the arbitrators' proper award of damages in Polymer, as distinct
from the "erroneous" substitution of discipline in Port Arthur. In Re Fabrihowever, the consequential relief involved the reinstatecated Steel Products,
73
ment of the grievor.
The reasoning in Re InternationalNickel and Re FabricatedSteel Products, therefore, combined to significantly undercut the rule in Port Arthur.
For example, in Re De Haan Cartage Co. Ltd.,7 4 the arbitrator found that a
four week suspension lay beyond the "reasonable range of responses", so
that just cause was not established; a three week suspension with compensation for the last week was ordered as "consequential relief."
The case of Re SKD Manufacturing Ltd. also deserves mention. The
arbitrator recognized the authoritative nature of the Court's ruling "to the
extent that the Supreme Court has stated the law regarding the interpretation
of this type of collective agreement provision. '75 The language of the judgment, though, have to be read in the context of the particular facts of the case.
That is:
We would interpret this language as related to a context of admitted serious
found
breach of an explicit provision of the collective agreement which has been
7
by the Court to constitute proper cause for dismissal, as a matter of law. 6

71 (1970), 22 L.A.C. 210 (O'Shea). See, also, Re East Side Stamping Co. Ltd.
(1969), 20 L.A.C. 23 (Christie).
72
Unreported, 1970.
73
See, also, Re Ford Motor Co. of Canada,Ltd. (1970), 22 L.A.C. 35 (Weatherill);
Re Bendix-Eclipse of Canada,Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Weatherill).
74 Unreported, 1970 (Weatherill).
75 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 231 (Weiler) at 234.
76 Id.at 237.
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It was concluded that the rule in Port Arthur did not necessarily preclude
arbitral review of the quality of discipline imposed where less serious breaches
occurred. Firmly established arbitral doctrines were referred to as grounding
the arbitrator's right to assess the appropriateness of the discipline chosen as
a function of the entire circumstances of the incident. The phraseology echoes
that of Weatherill in Re InternationalNickel: "Management must not select a
penalty which is unreasonably out of proportion to the particular offence in
the circumstances. '77 Additionally, the collective agreement was interpreted as
granting special authority to the arbitration board to review the company's
dismissal of an employee thereby, fulfilling the requirement in Port Arthur
agreement were needed to justify interthat express words in the collective
78
ference with the penalty selected.
Thus, despite the seemingly broad scope of the language in Port Arthur,
some arbitrators rapidly developed rationales to soften the severity of the
rule. But the arguments relied on seem to have imposed an interpretation on
the Court's reasoning with which the Court would be unlikely to agree. For
this reason, many arbitrators felt bound by Port Arthur to reach an admittedly
unpalatable result. Clearly, the number and importance of discipline grievances could not be underestimated. Employee frustration as a result of arbitrators' inability to relieve against an unwarranted form of discipline would
not facilitate harmonious employer-employee relations. Arbitral semantics
correct the problem: it remained for the Legislaalone could not effectively
9
ture to intervene.7
7.

Legislative Intervention

The Ontario Legislature in November, 1970 enacted s. 37(8) of the
OLRA authorizing, as a substitute for discharge or discipline, such other
penalty as "seems just and reasonable in all the circumstances." The amendment was proclaimed in force in January, 1971. However, arbitrators were
precluded from exercising such discretion where the collective agreement
provided a specific penalty for the alleged infraction. This caveat is not likely
to represent any significant reduction of the arbitrator's powers, for collective
agreements do not often attain such particularity in disciplinary matters,
although a few such instances have arisen.80
Arguments may be made for and against the exception in s. 37(8). On
the one hand, there are compelling reasons for upholding arbitral discretion
regarding discipline irrespective of specific penalties in the collective agreement. Penal responses are not likely to be uniform throughout an industry, so
77 Id. at 242.
78 Arbitrators generally seemed to prefer the guidelines formulated in International
Nickel but Re SKD Manufacturing was also cited in later arbitral awards, notably in
Re Phillips Cables Ltd. (1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 35 (Adams).
0
7 A letter to Dalton Bales in November, 1968, urging statutory reform of the
effect of judicial intervention in Port Arthur and several other cases was signed by all
practising arbitrators in the province except those former members of the judiciary.
8
0See, Re CanadaPackers Ltd., unreported, 1970 (O'Shea); Re Great Lakes Papers

Co. Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Duthie); Re Spruce Falls Power and Paper Co. Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Abbott); Re Lake Ontario Steel, unreported, 1975 (O'Shea).
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the arbitrator should be free to fashion the remedy appropriate to the infraction in the particular context. However, the collective agreement remains a
contractual document, albeit a unique one. Where a specific penalty for a
particular infraction emerges as a result of the negotiation process, this expression of the parties' intention should not be simply disregarded.
Arbitrators have not commented on the issue; rather the collective agreement is stated to permit or exclude arbitral authority under s. 37(8). However, in Re Dufferin Material & Construction Ltd.,81 the arbitrator did hold
that company rules stipulating a specific penalty for insubordination did not
come within the exception to arbitral discretion in s. 37(8) as such rules
were an expression of company policy and not a result of collective bargaining.
There has been one instance of judicial review on the point. In Re
Hamilton Street Railway Co.,82 the collective agreement provided that the
company could discharge an employee for reasonable cause and that reporting to work with alcoholic breath was deemed to constitute sufficient cause for
dismissal. The arbitrator ruled that the clause merely defined one instance
where dismissal may be imposed; that is, the power to modify the penalty
under s. 37(8) continued unabated. On certiorari,the award was quashed.
Hughes, J. reasoned that the combined effect of the collective agreement terms
was to provide for a specific penalty for the infraction, thereby coming within
the exception in the amendment. It may be, therefore, that arbitrators will
tend to interpret the collective agreement so as to avoid the restriction on
their authority contained in s. 37(8) except where such a conclusion is inescapable.
There is no doubt that the amendment authorized, or reinstated, the
remedial power of the arbitrator in discipline grievances. But arbitrators did
not seem to view the amendment as an open invitation to modify penalties
without restraint. Words of caution abound in the awards issued shortly after
the legislative change. In Re Gould Manufacturing of CanadaLtd., it was said
that the arbitrator should use his wide powers under s. 37(8) "not frivolously
or capriciously but with some attempt at objectivity." 3
Indeed, some arbitrators sounded unnecessarily cautious in formulating
guidelines for the invocation of s. 37(8): in Re Galt Metal Industries Ltd.
the arbitrator approved of substitution only where "the penalty imposed is,
viewed objectively, manifestly unjust or unreasonable in all the circumstances." 8 4 The inappropriateness of such deference to management in disciplinary cases (as contrasted with promotion grievances where management's
judgment and expertise are respected by arbitrators) was strongly argued
81 Unreported, 1972 (Brown).
82

[1972] 1 O.R. 270.

83

(1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 314 (Shime) at 319. See, also, Re Canadian Heat Treaters

Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Brown).
84
See, also, Re Atlas Steels Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Simmons); Re MasseyFerguson Ltd., unreported, 1975 (McCullogh); Re Allied Chemical Canada Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Rayner); Re Gilbarco Canada Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Carter); Re
Brockville Chemical Industries Ltd. (1971), 23 L.A.C. 336 (Shime).
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in Re Phillips Cables."; The expressions of caution are somewhat puzzling.
One would have thought no apology was needed for the exercise of a discretion only recently restored to the arbitrator's power by a legislative pronouncement. It may be, though, that arbitrators are attempting to demonstrate
to the courts a self-imposed restraint in order to avoid a judicial construction
of s. 37(8) limiting the scope of the amendment.
More commonly, arbitrators have relied on the test formulated in Re
International Nickel;8 6 that is, the scope of the amendment was coextensive
with penalties considered beyond the range of reasonable disciplinary responses. Arbitrators also revived the earlier jurisprudence indicating the type
of penalty appropriate to the alleged infraction.8 7 Finally, arbitrators seemed
to return to the notion in Re Hawker Siddley Canada Ltd.88 that the company must show "just cause" for its action, and the union may establish
"other" circumstances militating against the penalty imposed.89
The arbitral awards for 1971 and 1972 in which the discipline imposed
by the company was modified in some way can be tabulated according to the
stated grounds for the substitution of management's penalty:
Authorization for substitution:
S. 37(8) of the OLRA
Term in collective agreement
S. 37(8) and collective agreement
No Authority Stated

1971

1972

7
14
2
9

13
7
22
22

The results are interesting for several reasons. Arbitrators had previously relied on terms of the collective agreement in order to alter penalties; after the
amendment, that reliance sharply decreased. Correspondingly, express reliance on the authority of s. 37(8) increased, and, in fact, doubled. The statutory provision apparently granted greater discretion to arbitrators than did
the clauses in the collective agreements. Surprisingly, the arbitrators referred
to s. 37(8) as altering the rule in PortArthur in only four cases in 1971 and
two in 1972. It can be inferred that arbitrators were pleased with the amend85 (1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 35 (Adams).
8
USupra, note 63. This approach was adopted in Re University of Guelph, unreported, 1971 (Roberts); Re C. R. Snelgrove Co. Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Roberts); and
Re Ford Motor Co. (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 166 (Weatherill). Often, the reasonable
range test led to the dismissal of the grievance, as in Re Hamilton Gear and Machine
Co. Ltd. (1971), 22 L.A.C. 155 (Weatherill); Re Corporation of the Town of Dundas
(1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 161 (Reville); Re Kimberly Clark of Canada (1972), 2 L.A.C.
(2d) 195 (Brown); and Re Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada Ltd. (1972), 2 L.A.C.
(2d) 56 (Weiler).
87 For example, in Re Allied Chemical Canada,Limited, unreported, 1975 (Brandt),
a five-day suspension for insubordination was held consistent with arbitral precedents.
The acceptability of provocation as a mitigating factor in previous arbitral awards was
cited in Re Liquid Carbonic CanadaLtd. (1972), 24 L.A.C. 409 (Weiler) as justifying
reinstatement.
88 (1968), 19 L.A.C. 375 (O'Shea).
89
Re Air Terminal Transport Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Brown).

Grievance Arbitration

1976]

ment but wished to ignore the reason for its enactment. But of more interest
is the large number of cases in which no authority was stated. In a number of
decisions even in the first year of the legislative amendment, arbitrators simply
returned to their former practice of exercising remedial authority in discipline
grievances as if Port Arthur had never existed. A random sampling of 1973
cases by the author bears out this trend. There was virtually no reference
to the collective agreement authorizing substitution of penalties and the number of decisions giving no authority was twice as great as the instances referring to s. 37(8).
It may be concluded that for discipline grievances the amendment erased
the effect of the Port Arthur case. The remedial authority of the arbitrator to
fashion appropriate penalties for disciplinary acts was restored, except where
the collective agreement stipulated a specific penalty. Earlier arbitral jurisprudence outlining factors in mitigation of disciplinary measures again became
useful. The legislation, of course, could not undo the injustice inflicted under
the Port Arthur rule.
8.

Postscript
In Re Honeywell Controls Ltd., the arbitrator refused to follow Port
Arthur in order to uphold the discharge of the grievor, commenting that "the
case itself canont be considered to be strong at this time since the Act has
been amended since that case was decided."90 It would not be accurate, however, to depict the legislation as sounding the death-knell of the dicta in Port
Arthur.
The notion that the arbitrator may not "usurp the function of management" occupies a prominent place in promotion grievances, where considerable deference is paid to the judgment of management in selecting employees
for promotion. For example, in Re C.G.E. Co. Ltd.,9 1 the arbitrator determined that the grievance should succeed, but, in order to avoid assuming the
role of management, ordered that the grievor be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the requisite ability; the company was to promote the grievor
if his performance proved relatively equal to the incumbent's. This approach
follows the Ontario Court of Appeal's holding in Re Falconbridge Nickel
Mines Ltd.9 2 that once an arbitration board finds that the company has erred
in selecting an applicant for promotion, the matter should be referred back to
the company for reconsideration with appropriate directions. According to
the Port Arthur ruling, an arbitration board that determines which candidate
should succeed to the vacancy commits reversible error.
Port Arthur is also frequently cited as requiring a literal or strict reading
of the collective agreement. That is, the arbitrator, in going outside the words
of the collective agreement, is really effecting a modification of that agreement
contrary to the authoritative pronouncement of the court that he has no jurisdiction to do so.
9

0Unreported, 1971 (Campbell).

9' (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 359 (Johnston).
92

[1973] 1 O.R. 136.
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Thus, the legacy of Port Arthur goes beyond the substitution of one
disciplinary measure for another. Rather, the Court's judgment in that case
was predicated on a narrow view of arbitration. The remedial authority of the
arbitrator was derived from and defined by the words of the collective agreement. This position stands in direct contrast to the arbitrator's approach in
Polymer that the Legislature had vested original jurisdiction without right of
appeal in arbitrators to effect a final and binding settlement of disputes under
the collective agreement. While the s. 37(8) amendment displaced the Port
Arthur rule from the field of disciplinary grievances, it left untouched the application of the dicta to other areas of labour arbitration.
C.

HOOGENDOORN - NATURAL JUSTICE IN A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING REGIME

1.

The Issues: The Substantive Rights of Individual Employees

The OLRA reflects the intention of the legislature to institutionalize the
collective bargaining regime. A nascent union is insulated from employer
interference, whether directed against the union itself or against individual
employees seeking to organize or obtain membership in a union, by virtue of
the unfair practice provisions. Elaborate certification procedures are available
should the union fail to secure (or not wish to secure) voluntary recognition
by the employer. The result of such certification or voluntary recognition is to
further buttress the union's position because it is thereby recognized as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The principle of the exclusivity of the union's right to bargain with the
employer represents a significant reduction of individual rights. Firstly, it must
be stressed that the union, once certified, represents all employees in the bargaining unit whether or not they are members of the union itself. The individual
employee loses his right to negotiate the terms of his employment in return
for the right to share in those terms and conditions secured by the negotia93
tion of a collective agreement covering all employees in the bargaining unit.
Moreover, the individual employee is not entitled to participate as an individual in the negotiation of that collective agreement; the bargaining is conducted by the representatives of the union.94
Patently, proper subjects for negotiation include wage rates, hours of

03

The leading case is Le Syndicat Catholique des Employes des Magasins de Que-

bec Inc. v. La Cornpagnie Paquet Ltee. (1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346 (S.C.C.). Per
Judson, J. at 353-54, where the union is certified:
There is no room left for private negotiation between employer and employee.
Certainly to the extent of the matters covered by the collective agreement, freedom of contract between master and individual servant is abrogated. The collective
agreement tells the employer on what terms he must in the future conduct his
master and servant relations.
04 Obviously, some of the union representatives will be employees in the bargaining
unit; but their right to participate at the bargaining table is derived from their status
as union representatives, not employees.
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work, shift schedules, seniority clauses, and similar matters. But beyond this,
the union is specifically authorized under s. 38(1) of the OLRA to bargain
concerning its own security. That is, the collective agreement may require, as
a condition of employment, membership, and/or dues payment to the trade
union. This approval by the Legislature of the union's right to secure its position through the collective agreement further restricts the scope of individual
freedom. The individual may be required to join the union before hiring (as
in the closed shop), within a specified period after employment commences
(as in a union shop) or to remit the equivalent of dues to the union through
a check-off procedure without actually becoming a member (as in the "Rand
formula").
This abridgement of individual rights has been justified on several
grounds. The leverage of the union at the bargaining table is a function, inter
alia, of employee solidarity with its bargaining representative and that representative's financial resources. At the very minimum, employees who secure
the benefits of collective bargaining should be obliged to support their bargaining agent. That is, if all the employees in the bargaining unit must be
represented by the union, that union should be entitled to look to those employees for financial contributions. Further, since it is legislative policy to
encourage a collective bargaining regime, any financial advantage, such as
relief from dues payment, in remaining outside this system should be denied.
Finally, the presence of non-union workers undermines the bargaining
strength of the union. The greater the union control over the labour supply
available to the employer, particularly during a strike, the greater the pressure on the employer to accede to union demands at the bargaining table.
Compulsory union membership, then, secures a union monopoly over the
supply of labour.
The legislature was clearly seeking countervailing power blocs - the
union, as exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees in the bargaining
unit (and, thereby, controller of the supply of labour) versus the employer
who controlled employment opportunities, that is, the offer of wage payments
in return for labour. It was recognized that organization of the workers was
the only effective means of ensuring a more equitable distribution of the profits
from labour. And it was felt that the institutionalization of collective bargaining was the most desirable method of permitting organization of labour and yet
securing industrial peace. Fundamental was the right of every person to join
a trade union of his own choice and to participate in its lawful activities.'
However, the advancement of individual employee rights was predicated upon
a cohesive trade union. It was not simply a matter of subordinating individual
freedoms to some utilitarian notion of the "greatest good for the greatest number" but rather a conviction that the freedom of an individual employee in
the labour market was ephemeral. The Legislature did not regard the common law doctrine of freedom of contract in an employment context as relevant or realistic. It was recognized that those with only their labour to sell
could not negotiate on an equal basis with employers; in reality, the contract
of employment was dictated by the hirer. Absent the voluntary agreement of
95 See, OLRA, supra, note 4, s. 3.
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both parties to the contract, contractual freedom became a meaningless principle. The individual rights supposedly abrogated by union security clauses
and exclusive bargaining rights were illusory.
The negotiation of the collective agreement, therefore, was restricted to
only two parties, the union and the employer. This exclusivity was continued
in the administration of the bargain. The collective agreement and arbitral
awards, where the mandatory arbitration provision had been invoked to settle
disputes, were made binding on the employer, the trade union and the employees in the bargaining unit.9 6 Yet, the parties to the negotiation, arbitration
and grievance processes comprise only the union, as exclusive agent for the
employees, and the employer. The OLRA is silent regarding the rights of individual employees to initiate or participate in such matters other than under
union auspices.
The perspective of the judiciary, however, is primarily individualistic.
The doctrine of natural justice, although difficult to define, was developed to
protect individual rights. A denial of natural justice would result in the quashing of the decision of the tribunal by the courts on review and the substitution
of the "correct" decision or the remission of the case to the relevant tribunal
(although perhaps differently constituted) with directions.
The touchstone of natural justice was fairness: in the words of Lord
Loreburn, "they [boards] must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides,
for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. 'g7 And, fundamental to this fairness was the audi alteram partem rule, that is, any person
who will be directly affected by the decision of the tribunal was entitled to
participate in the proceedings as a party thereto. To quote Perdue, C.J.M.
in CanadianNorthern Railway v. Wilson,
It is an elementary principle of law that a man shall not suffer in person or in
property unless he has had an opportunity of being heard. This principle has been
reiterated in case after case for the last 300 years, not always expressed in the
same words, but with the same force and meaning.98

Since the function of arbitration boards is to adjudicate rights under the collective agreement, the principles of natural justice are applicable to the proceedings of such bodies.
But natural justice does not exist "in the air." The doctrine affords procedural safeguards where the authority of tribunals encroaches on substantive
rights of individuals; it cannot create those substantive rights or guarantee
justice except in so far as proper process tends to secure that end. The question, then, is what are the substantive rights of employees in a collective bargaining regime? It is only to those substantive rights that the principles of
natural justice can have application.
2.

The Rule in Bradley
The issue remitted to arbitration in Re Bradley and Ottawa Professional
Fire-FightersAssociation concerned the proper interpretation of the promo0 OLRA, id., ss. 42, 37 (9).
97 Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179 at 182.
98 Canadian Northern Railay v. Wilson (1918), 3 W.W.R. 730 at 735.
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tion clause in the collective agreement. However, the arbitrator went beyond
a declaratory ruling and ordered five of the six contested positions filled by the
grievors. 99 While the incumbents were aware of the arbitration proceedings,
and, in fact, three were present, none had been given notice that their promotions would be directly affected. Laskin, l.A. (as he then was) expressed the
view of the Ontario Court of Appeal:
The common law has been specially sensitive to deprivation of property or contractual advantages in proceedings of an adjudicative character without previous
notice thereof to persons likely to be directly affected, unless there is clear statutory exclusion of such notice.100

The contractual advantages in question were the increased employment benefits attached to the promotion. The court viewed the collective agreement as
creating substantive employment rights for individuals:
A collective agreement is a unique legal institution because, despite the generality
of its terms as part of a bargain made between a representative union and an
employer, its existence and application result in personal benefits to employees
who are covered by it.101

Individual employees were entitled to the protection afforded by the
doctrine of natural justice in any proceedings where these rights would be
affected. Generally, the parties to an arbitration proceeding could be expected
to fairly represent both sides of the issue; the requirement of natural justice
would, therefore, be satisfied. But once
the representative union is put to a choice between employees who competed for
the same preferment as to which it will support as against a different choice made
by the employer, substantive employment benefits of particular employees are put
in issue and they are entitled to protect them if the union will not.102

While the employer would be expected to urge affirmation of its position, such
action would not always be a certainty. Further, as the employer in no way
represents the interests of the employees affected, they, as individuals, should
be permitted to adduce argument on their own behalf.
But the test to be applied was the directness of the effect on the employment benefits. Where the union seeks a prospective ruling or a declaration, the
interests of employees would only be indirectly affected; the common law
notice requirement would be inapplicable. However, where vested employment benefits are jeopardized and the union ceases to represent all employees
for that arbitration, the affected employees are entitled to notice; they may
participate in the proceedings as parties.
The court specified the indicia of adequate notice as follows: written
indication of the issues, date, time and place of hearing; a right to be represented by counsel, service personally or by registered mail sufficient to permit a reasonable period of preparation. 0 3
99 Re Bradley and Ottawa Profession Fire Fighters Association [1967] 2 O.R. 311,
63 D.L.R. (2d) 376, (Ont. C.A.).
100 Id. at 317, 382.
101 Id. at 316, 381.
102 Id. at 316, 381.
103 Id. at 317, 382.
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The Rule in Hoogendoorn

In Hoogendoorn, the arbitrator interpreted the union security clause as
requiring union dues checkoff as a condition of employment but further indicated that the discharge of a named individual employee would be required
unless the dues deduction was authorized, despite that individual's religious
and political objections thereto.
Laskin, J.A. (as he then was) delivered the judgment in the Court of
Appeal. Individual freedom was not considered an absolute value:
Our society secures to every one the right to adhere to a religion of his choice and
to hold a self-determined political creed. It does not, however, give liberty to
insist on religious conviction or political creed or both in contexts which the law
does not regard as relevant to their free enjoyment and as a ground for thwarting
04
agreements binding on all irrespective of religious or political persuasion.'
That the union is authorized to negotiate collective agreements and conduct
arbitration proceedings as the representative of the employees to the derogation of individual freedom is recognized as legitimate legislative policy. The
policy grievance here "is an extension of the administration of the bargain by
the parties who concluded it."105 Just as individual employees are not entitled
to participate in the negotiation of the collective agreement, although affected
by the result, so too, they may not intervene as of right in a policy grievance
involving the interpretation of the collective agreement, although likewise affected by the result. While it was not strange that the arbitrator personalized
his award in light of the circumstances of the case, reference to Hoogendoom,
if it went beyond the issues properly raised at the arbitration, was severable
from the decision. Thus, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered individual
rights at common law in the context of statutory enactments in the labour relations field.
This reasoning was echoed in the dissent of Judson, J.in the Supreme
Court of Canada:
No individual employee is entitled as of right to be present during bargaining or
at the conclusion of such an agreement. To require that notice and the right to
be present be given to each employee on any occasion when a provision in a
collective agreement having general application to all employees was being interpreted would be to destroy the principle of the bargaining agent and to vitiate
the purpose of the Act.' 06
The majority of the Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeal and quashed the arbitrator's award. The court focussed entirely on the background of
the case:
On the facts it is obvious that the proceeding was aimed entirely at securing
Hoogendoorn's dismissal. . . .The arbitration proceeding was not necessary to
determine that Hoogendoorn was required so to do (authorize the dues deduction) ...The union actively
took a position completely adverse to Hoogendoorn.
It wanted him dismissed.' 0 T
104

(1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 167 at 178; [1967] 1 O.R. 712 at 723.

105 Id. at 180, 725.
106 (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641 at 644; [1968] S.C.R. 30 at 34.
107 Id. at 648-49; 38-39.
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The fact that the arbitrator's ruling could not have affected Hoogendoom,
and that the union could not have required his discharge, had he authorized
the dues deduction, was ignored.
The Court rested its decision on a denial of natural justice. Yet the very
case it referred to in support, University of Ceylon v. Fernando'0 8 is readily
distinguishable. The procedures appropriate to protect the rights of an individual accused of cheating and faced with expulsion from university may be
analogized to the criminal law safeguards afforded an accused, i.e., the right
to know the charges, present his case, and face an impartial tribunal acting
in good faith. But, the possibility (probability) that Hoogendoom would
be 'expelled' from his employment does not justify adoption of the reasoning
in Fernando. For the points of contrast with Fernando are more significant:
in Hoogendoorn, the union was seeking a declaratory ruling from an arbitrator under the aegis of the OLRA; a union security clause similar to that in
question was specifically permitted under the Act; the arbitrator's decision
dealt with all the employees and did not constitute a 'sentence' for Hoogendoom unless he refused to abide by the ruling. Finally, the reason for permitting the accused to participate in Fernando was to ensure the elucidation
of all relevant facts and thereby achieve a just result. But the participation
of Hoogendoorn in a policy grievance dealing with the proper interpretation
of the union security clause would only serve to interject his personal antipathy toward joining a union and paying dues.
The Court's decision reaffirmed the common law audi alteram partem
rule as a procedural requirement in labour arbitration. The Court refused to
distinguish the Bradley decision, ignoring the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in that case, or to heed the warning of Judson, J., cited earlier,, that an
unrestricted notice requirement would hamstring the collective bargaining
regime at the arbitration level. Thus, the doctrine of natural justice was declared applicable to arbitration proceedings without any clarification of the
substantive right of the employee which that doctrine was to protect. Labour
arbitrators were simply left with the dicta that it would be reversible error
if the appropriate parties were not given adequate notice of and opportunity
to participate in the proceedings.
4.

The Arbitrators'Response
It is fair to say that arbitrators reacted with surprise to the Court's ruling
on notice. The mandatory arbitration clause had been viewed as a necessary
adjunct to a collective bargaining regime where the right to strike during the
term of the collective agreement was denied. Just as the negotiation of the collective agreement intimately affected individual employees but was solely within
the control of the union and the company, so, too, the arbitration proceedings
were considered to be restricted to the same 'parties'. Arbitration had previously
functioned quite effectively without reliance on the common law audi alteram
partem rule. Arbitral reaction was best expressed by Professor Johnston:
It has been necessary for this Board to undertake this rather extended analysis

108 [1960] 1 All E.R. 631.
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of a legal principle because of the novelty of the notice provision in Canadian
labour arbitration and because of the turbulent sea into which the principle has
been cast in the Bradley and Hoogendoorn decisions. 0 9
Arbitrators generally tried to restrict the scope of the Hoogendoorn dicta
to Bradley. Again, in the words of Johnston,
It is our view that the law as stated in Hoogendoorn and Bradley then only requires notice to a third party when that party's rights are directly affected by the
result of an arbitration. In the present case, a union policy grievance claiming
certain classifications come within the scope of the agreement, there is not such
a direct effect."10
Nonetheless, as the company had requested that the four affected employees
be notified and the union did not object, and so as to avoid risk of reversal
on certiorari,the arbitrator concluded that notice should be given "as a matter of fairness.""'
Even where the rule should clearly apply, as in grievances alleging wrong-

ful promotion in violation of the seniority rights clause, some arbitrators tried
2
to balance the indicia of proper notice against the exigencies of arbitration. 1

Technically, notice should be in writing, giving all particulars of the hearing,
and in the absence of proof of such 'reasonably formal and complete notice',
the arbitrator should adjourn the proceedings. 118 To be sure, some arbitrators,
notably former members of the judiciary, insisted on strict compliance with
such requirements. In Re Brockville Chemical Industries,1 4 verbal notifica-

tion by the union to affected employees was rejected as insufficient; proceedings were adjourned to permit adequate compliance with the Bradley notice
rules. Informal notice was similarly rejected in Re Corporation of the Town
of Essex 1 5 with the hearing adjourned to a later date. In four other instances, the initial hearing was postponed to permit proper notification of
appropriate parties. 110
Several methods of sidestepping the necessity for adjournment developed
10

9 Re Air Canada Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Johnston).

110 Id.

111 By way of contrast, however, in Re FalconbridgeNickel Mines Ltd., (1974), 7
L.A.C. (2d) 389 (Brown), notice was given to all "employees who might have had an
interest in the result of this grievance... of their right to attend and participate in the
hearing, none of whom did so"; the issue in the case was only one of compensation.
It is difficult to conceive of a 'direct' effect on employees sufficient to invoke the Bradley
rule where the ruling might order the company to pay compensation to other employees.
112 Re CarlingBreveries Ltd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 110 (Christie).
113 Such proof of formal service was tendered and accepted at the hearing in Re
Toronto Hydro-Electric System, unreported, 1972 (Schiff).
114 (1972), 24 L.A.C. 423 (Reville). It should be noted that neither adjournment
proved of value: in Brockville, there is no indication that any affected employees even
appeared and in Town of Essex, unreported, 1971 (Steward), such individuals attended
the hearing but in no way participated in the proceedings.
IN Id.
11
6Re General Refractories Co., unreported, 1975 (Shime); Re Honeywell Controls
Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Egan); Re Ford Motor Co., unreported, 1972 (Palmer); Re
Regency Tower Hotel Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Schiff). Again it must be mentioned that
the notified employee(s) failed to register an appearance, except in the General Refractories case where the individual did participate.
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where lack of proper notice became apparent at the hearing. In Re Orenda
Ltd., 117 counsel initially agreed that no employees were entitled to notice
under the Hoogendoorn-Bradley rule. After commencement of the proceedings, three individuals, called as union witnesses, were found to be so entitled.
The arbitrator informed them their rights and reviewed for their benefit the
evidence of a previous witness. The three then remained as parties in the
grievance. The arbitrator in Re Gilbarco Canada Ltd.18 decided to hear
the company's evidence, then adjourn if need be, in order to permit adequate
notice if an individual's job appeared in jeopardy. However, as the company
provided a complete refutation of the alleged improper promotion, adjournment proved unnecessary. Again, in Re Carling Breweries,"9 the arbitrator
acknowledged that the incumbent should have been notified, but "as the
grievance has been denied . . .there is no reason to be concerned about

notice."' 20 Since the grievance is dismissed in the vast majority of instances,' 2 '
the policy of receiving evidence and giving notice only where the grievance
may be upheld circumvents the Court's dicta regarding notice.
Other arbitrators accepted verbal notice, even at the commencement of
proceedings, in lieu of written contact. In Re The Griffith Mine, 2 2 an alleged
case of wrongful promotion, the incumbent had not been notified of the
hearing; the arbitrator contacted the individual at work by telephone and advised him of his rights. Having been satisfied that the employee freely declined
to attend or participate, the arbitrator continued the proceedings. In Re
Canadian Acme Screw & Gear,12m both union and company counsel were
ordered to advise the incumbent of his rights by telephone; given the report
that the employee had no desire to attend or be represented at the hearing,
the arbitrator resumed the hearing.
Finally, in two recent instances, arbitrators adjudicated the dispute but
delayed implementation of the award until satisfactory notice had been given.
The arbitrator in Re Edwards of Canada ordered that
should the ruling (upholding the grievance) detrimentally affect another employee
in the bargaining unit not given notice of hearing, he is to be apprised of this
award immediately upon its receipt by the parties, and be given 7 days to submit
why the award is in error and why he should
reasons to this arbitrator outlining
not be replaced by the grievor. 12 4
117 (1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 73 (Lysyk).
118 (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 348 (Carter).
119 Supra, note 112.
12o Recognizing that "this, however, is obviously ex poste facto justification", the
arbitrator indicated that in a future case the hearing would be adjourned pending satisfactory notification. The instant case, though, escaped adherence to the common law
rule.
121 See, Table 6, infra, at p. 697.
122 Unreported, 1973 (Abbott). In that case, the counsel for the company also
discussed the defence of the employee's interests, as the company's choice, by telephone.
123 (1970), 22 L.A.C. 80 (Hanrahan).
124 (1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 137 at 147. Curiously, the arbitrator added at 147:
"While I think the interests of any such person have been adequately represented by the
company, I believe the reasoning in Hoogendoorn supports this kind of opportunity
being afforded." The Court in Hoogendoorn would likely express astonishment that the
audi alteram partem rule could properly be transformed into an opportunity to prove
the arbitrator in error after the award had been issued.
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Again, in Re McMaster University, the arbitrator determined that although
counsel for both parties who are very experienced in these matters submitted that
it was not necessary that [another named employee] be given notice of the proceedings ... the Board deems it advisable that [said employee] be served with a copy
of both parties to see that he is
of this award and that it is the responsibility
served with a copy of the award. 25

The named employee was given 10 days thereafter to inform the Board in

writing of his desire to make representations.
Aside from technical arguments as to the constituent elements of proper
notice, it must be stressed that a significant number of arbitrators have simply
ignored the Court's dicta in Hoogendoorn and Bradley. Of the cases surveyed,
fully 40 per cent did not comply with the audi alteram partem rule. In those
cases which could be classified as 'policy grievances', the figures rose to 45.8
per cent. Even in instances comprising 'individual grievances' within the
Bradley rule, in 39.8 per cent of cases proper notice was lacking. 2 6
The broad language regarding notice in Hoogendoorn presented the ar-

bitrators with a dilemma. To ignore the ruling meant risk of reversal on review for a denial of natural justice. To comply fully with the court's notice
formula required an adjournment of the hearing should some individual come
within the rule. And adjournment inevitably increased costs to the parties and
sometimes hindered the presentation of the case itself, as in situations where
witnesses had left the employ of the company. But of even greater importance
was the thwarting of the purpose of arbitration: to provide a speedy resolution
of disputes, thereby reducing employee frustration with the collective bargain-

ing regime. The audi alteram partem rule, far from affording justice to the
individual, represented an unwanted and undesirable technicality.
Further, the notice requirement presumes that the company and the
union may not adequately present all the issues and facts, and that the latter

may in some way be biased. 27 While the majority in the Supreme Court would

find in Hoogendoorn support for this presumption, other members of that
Court (and other courts) would disagree. But the point is that the presumption belies the collective bargaining process itself. To accord an affected employee the right to intervene as a party in an arbitration hearing accomplishes
125 Unreported, 1975 (Shime).
120 The data is broken down in more detail, infra. The mention here of gross statistics, however, serves to indicate the magnitude of the arbitral response of simply ignoring the courts.
127 This imputation of bias usually overlooks the fact that the 'affected' individual
is commonly a member of the bargaining unit. For example, in Re Domtar Fine Papers
Ltd. (1974), 5 L.A.C. (2d) 191 (Simmons), the union stressed that the grievance did
not represent favouritism as both individuals were local members, but a disagreement over
the proper application of the collective agreement regarding promotion; the union would
have acted, similarly if it was felt that the 'affected' employee had had his rights abused.
Another arbitrator only thinly disguised his displeasure with the notice requirement and
its allegation of unfairness: the incumbent had been informed "of his right to appear
personally with counsel but he has not indicated any dissatisfaction with the representation of his interest by the Borough." Re Corporation of the Borough of North York,
unreported, 1971 (Weiler).
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little when it is not within the power of that employee to bring the matter to
arbitration in the first place. For just as the union may choose not to proceed
with the grievance, and deny the grievor a hearing, 28 so too, the company
may settle the grievance before arbitration by rescinding the promotion or
otherwise accepting the union's position. And, whereas the aggrieved individual may succeed on an application before the OLRB alleging breach of
the duty of fair representation if the union refuses to process a grievance, i -9
the affected individual has no such rights as against the company - unless,
of course, the union processes his grievance.
The Court in Hoogendoorn reaffirmed the common law notice rule as a
prerequisite to valid labour arbitration. What the court did not do was indicate
the limits of the doctrine or offer a compelling rationale for its promulgation.
Responses varied, not surprisingly, in view of the number and backgrounds
of the arbitrators, but distinct patterns did emerge.
5.

The Reach of Bradley and Hoogendoorn:ContractingOut

The Bradley ratio clearly limited notice requirements to employees
covered by the collective agreement; the dicta in Hoogendoorn seemed to indicate that anyone who might be adversely affected by the arbitral award was
entitled as of right to participate as a party. A literal reading of Hoogendoorn
would include those persons performing work which the union claimed rightfully belonged to the bargaining unit. 130
Re Somerville Industries Ltd.1 1 represents the high water mark of the
notice rule. The grievance alleged performance of work by non-bargaining
unit employees while union members were laid off. Another union representing those employees doing the disputed work wished to intervene on the
grounds that, if the grievance were upheld, its members would be adversely
affected. The grieving union contended that locus standi to intervene was
restricted to those who enjoyed rights under the collective agreement inquestion and were bound by the arbitral award. The arbitrator cited Bradley and
De Smithim2 as supporting a broad view of locus standi: "Clearly, in the instant situation, the intervening union will possibly be affected by a decision of
this board, the potential importance of this effect being sufficient to warrant
128

Unless the collective agreement specifically provides for the right of an in-

dividual to process a grievance irrespective of union sponsorship.
129 OLRA, supra, note 4, s.60.

13 0 The cases in this section were not included in the statistics as policy grievances
although it is recognized that a grievance alleging wrongful contracting out (e.g., to an

independent contractor or another union) does shade into a grievance alleging wrongful
work assignment (e.g., to a foreman). While the awards are not always clear on the
point, it was attempted to distinguish 'contracting out' cases, which for the most part
involved persons outside the company from 'policy grievances' dealing with work assignments to employees of the company but outside the bargaining unit.
131 (1967), 20 L.A.C. 404 (Palmer).
132 S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (3d ed. London:
Stevens, 1973).
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their participation in this matter."'13 The Board ruled that the intervening
union might attend hearings, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses and
submit argument. The Board saw "a positive advantage to all parties by such
a hearing
as this should tend to promote the speedy resolution of this
34
matter.",1
The decision can be criticized on several grounds. First, Bradley was misinterpreted; that case clearly urged a limited scope for the audi alteram partem
rule in that the persons entitled to notice must be covered by the collective
agreement. Secondly, the ruling misconceives the arbitrator's role. He is to
adjudicate disputes arising under a specific collective agreement, not to usurp
the OLRB's authority regarding union jurisdictional questions nor to sit as
a court of law. The power of the courts to permit the joining of interested
third parties under Rule 609 of the Ontario Rules of Practice is designed to
avoid a multiplicity of proceedings; arbitration is conceived as a vehicle to
permit efficient functioning of a collective bargaining regime. The procedures
appropriate to the former are not identical to those needed for the latter 8 5
If the parties may include other unions (and presumably their members as individuals whose interests may not be coextensive with their union) and independent contractors (and their employees), the touchstone of labour arbitration - the collective agreement between a union and employer - is lost.
As a practical matter, such proceedings would become unwieldy and exorbitantly expensive.' 3 6 Finally, the evidence in contracting-out situations may be
assumed to be adequately adduced by the union and employer. That is, the
interveners, as witnesses could describe their jobs and perhaps their reasons
for preferring the status quo, but they would not be helpful in determining
the issue remitted to the arbitrator - the interpretation of the collective
agreement.
Fortunately, the argument, in Re Somerville Industries attracted few
adherents. In Re Orenda Ltd.,13 7 the grievance alleged that non-bargaining
unit employees were wrongly given a work assignment. Notice to the individuals who might be affected by the award was given, and three such employees
represented themselves at the hearing but did not otherwise participate.
In Re Omega Marble Co. Ltd.' 88 where the arbitrator held he lacked jurisdiction to settle a dispute which was properly the subject of an OLRB
183 Supra, note 131 at 405. It should be noted that the arbitrator felt that even if

participation as of right were not possible, the discretionary power of the board under
s. 34(7) of the Act should be exercised to permit such intervention.
134 Id. at 406.
135 This point was raised by the arbitrator in Re A. V. Hallam Lathing & Plastering
Ltd., unreported, 1974 (Weatherill) where the grievance sought damages for the assignment of work to another union: "There is no provision for any form of interpleader
proceedings, although the right of parties directly affected by an award to appear has,
in cases involving individuals, been upheld by the courts in certain cases".
130And it must be remembered that costs are borne, by statutory prescription,
only by the original union and employer.
187 Supra,note 117.
188 (1971), 22 L.A.C. 221 (Johnston).
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application, the arbitrator suggested that the other union should at the very
least be heard. 139
For the most part, however, arbitrators have rejected the extension of
the common law notice requirement to cases of alleged improper contracting
out - usually the issue is not even raised. 140 It must also be mentioned that
the arbitrator in Somerville Industries did not pursue this issue; notice to individuals outside the bargaining unit, who might be affected by the outcome
of the grievance, was not given in three subsequent cases. 141
The foregoing discussion does, however, graphically illustrate the potentially disastrous effects of transplanting the common law notion of natural
justice into the labour relations context without careful analysis of the function of that doctrine in the legal context and the extent to which that function
is necessary in labour arbitration.
6.

Policy Grievances

The term policy grievance contrasts with an individual grievance, that is,
a grievance processed by the union on behalf of a specific individual or individuals alleging a breach of a provision in the collective agreement depriving
them of an immediate benefit. Individual grievances most commonly involve
promotions, wage payments, overtime opportunities, and the like. A policy
grievance (sometimes called a union or group grievance), however, deals
with the interpretation of the collective agreement, and seeks a declaration
as to such matters as the composition of the bargaining unit, the meaning of
the union security clause, or the effect of the seniority provisions (including
calculation of seniority). Essentially, as indicated by Laskin, l.A. (as he then
was) in Hoogendoorn, a policy grievance is a continuation of the collective
bargaining process; it is an "extension of the administration of the bargain
by the parties who concluded it."'4
The Court of Appeal in Bradley hinted at the holding made explicit in
Hoogendoorn by finding that the audi alteram partem rule was inapplicable
' 3 9 By way of contrast in Re Cooper Construction (Eastern)Ltd. (1971), 23 L.A.C.
62 (Hinnegan), the arbitrator assumed jurisdiction in a dispute essentially over work
assignment where the collective agreement specifically authorized this, but commented
at 70 that "nor is it forseeable that the rights of any third party would be affected."
140 Re Robertson - Yates Corp. Ltd. (1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 91 (Weatherill); Re
Douglas Aircraft Co. (1969), 21 L.A.C. 240 (O'Shea); Re Bendix-Eclipse of Canada
Ltd. (1972), 21 L.A.C. 19 (Christie); Re Air Canada (1971), 23 L.A.C. 406 (Bairstow);
Re Alexander Centre Industries Ltd., unreported, 1974 (Rayner); Re Algoma Central
Railway, unreported, 1973 (Weatherill); Re Allied Chemical Canada Ltd., unreported,
1973 (Weatherill).
14Re Hydro-Electric Power Commission (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 45 (Palmer);
Re Toronto Hydro-ElectricSystem (1972), 24 L.A.C. 308 (Palmer); Re Wean - McKay
of Canada Ltd. (1971), 23 L.A.C. 27 (Palmer).
142 Supra, note 104 at 180.
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to policy grievances because the effect on employees was only indirect."43
The terms of the Supreme Court of Canada decision however, extend to both
policy and individual grievances; the requirements of notice depend on
possible effects on individuals' contractual and property rights, and not on
classification of the grievance.
Theoretically, arbitrators should have been bound by the rule in Hoogendoom and thus have given notice where the interests of individuals might be
affected by the outcome of the grievance. Practice, however, did not follow
the principle of stare decisis. A sample of 59 arbitral decisions (reported
and unreported) for the period of 1969-1975 which could be classified as
policy grievances shows the following breakdown: 8 dealt with the assignment of work to individuals outside the bargaining unit; 17 with the scope
of the bargaining unit; 5 with deduction of union dues; 2 with wage increments in violation of the collective agreement; 22 with seniority rights in
general, e.g. layoff and recall order, seniority lists, and return of employees
to the bargaining unit; 1 with a reduction in work hours in lieu of layoff; and
2 with 'other'.
TABLE 1
Policy

Individuals

Not Notified
Notified
Attended
Participated
Did not Attend

Grievances

27
32
13)
11) overlap
17

As Table 1 indicates, the number of policy grievances in which no
notice was given was roughly equal to the number in which 'affected' individuals were notified. But the contacted individuals attended the proceedings in
fewer than half (13) of the 32 cases in which formal
notice was sent. In only
44
11 of the 32 cases was there any participation.1
The cases were then tabulated by year and by arbitrator. The data,
however, did not reveal any clear pattern in either instance. The number of
'notice' and 'no notice' cases neither increased nor decreased steadily from
1969 to 1975, but fluctuated from year to year. The only point to mention
is that 7 of the 'no notice' cases occurred in 1975; data for 1976 and 1977
143 The label 'indirect' really amounts to a conclusion, not a rationale; what seems

to be meant by the term is that the consequences of a policy grievance for employees

correspond to the consequences of negotiating the collective agreement itself - and,
as employees are not entitled to participate in negotiations qua individuals, so too, such
participation should not enure as of right in policy grievances.
144 If anything, the attendance and participation figures are high in that, if eight
employees were given notice and just one attended, as in Re City of Toronto (1974),
7 L.A.C. (2d) 53 (Simmons), the case was entered under the 'attended' column. The
term 'participation' included any activity beyond testifying as a witness, i.e., some indication that the individual was involved in the proceedings as a party.
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would be needed to indicate a trend toward avoiding the notice issue in policy
grievances. Similarly, classification by arbitrator yielded inconclusive results:
while some arbitrators gave no notice more often than others e.g., Weatherill
(6), Palmer (4), O'Shea (3) and Brandt (3), the figures likely only reflect a
greater arbitration load on these men because they did give notice approximately as often, e.g., Weatherill (5), O'Shea (5), and Palmer (3).
TABLE 2
Subject

Work Assignment Outside Bargaining Unit
Scope of Unit
Dues Deduction
Wage Rates Changes
General Seniority Rights
Reduction in Work Hours
Other

Notified

7
6
2
2
12
0
3

Not Notified

1
11
3
0
10
1
1

Participation

2
5
1
0
1
0
2

Total
32
27
11
Table 2 further indicates the uncertainty regarding notice requirements.
Generally, the figures in both categories are roughly the same. But there is one
notable difference. Where the issue concerned the assignment of work to individuals outside the bargaining unit, those individuals almost always received
notice of the proceedings (87.5 per cent); where the subject was the scope
of the bargaining unit, i.e., whether certain individuals were to be covered by
the collective agreement, the likelihood of notice dropped to about 1 in 3.
Yet, where notice was given, individuals were far more likely to participate in
the proceedings when the issue affected their possible inclusion in the bargaining unit, i.e., in 5 of 6 cases.
Several tentative conclusions may be drawn. First, arbitrators have not
embraced the rule in Hoogendoorn; in almost half the cases of policy grievances where notice should have been required, none was given. In addition,
arbitrators have not fashioned guidelines restricting the notice requirements,
for example, to the criteria set out by the Court of Appeal. Notice seems to
depend on chance events, such as the parties readily identifying an individual,
or, perhaps, one of the parties raising the matter. For the most part, arbitrators appear to be avoiding the issue entirely. For example; of the 59 cases,
only 3 even mentioned Hoogendoorn or Bradley.
This point is further illustrated in four awards whose fact situations are
reminiscent of Hoogendoorn.In Re Vibrapipe Concrete Products, 45 the union
sought dues payments and the dismissal of certain employees unless union
membership was obtained. Several of the employees were represented by
counsel. The grievance was upheld, subject to a union undertaking to pro145

Unrenorted. 1973 (McCaughey).
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cess the applications without discrimination and levy the regular initiation
fees. In General Concrete of Canada Ltd.,146 five named employees, represented by counsel, were ordered to join the union within 30 days of the
award. In Re Ottawa Citizen,' 47 the union sought the dismissal of two employees, who were represented by counsel; the grievance was denied on the
basis that the union had wrongfully rejected membership applications because
the men had refused to participate in an illegal strike. None of these cases
referred to the court's dicta concerning notice.
Only in Re Ralph Milrod Metal Products Ltd. 48 was Hoogendoom cited.
There the union security clause had been changed from a dues checkoff to a
closed shop; two employees refused to join and the company was ordered to
dismiss the men. However, as the employees had attended under the auspices
of the company, and not as parties to the proceedings, the discharge award
was not to be implemented for 30 days to allow the employees to make individual representations. Despite the obiter in Bradley, the arbitrator did not
wish to increase costs for the parties or delay settling the dispute by granting
an adjournment. The arbitrator felt constrained by the court's ruling to grant
some opportunity for the individual employees to 'make representations' on
their own behalf, but his choice of means reveals his estimation of their
probable impact on the decision.
What the arbitrators wished to avoid was best illustrated in Re Algoma
Steel Corp. Ltd.1 4 9 The issue concerned the alleged inclusion of 60 named
employees in the bargaining unit. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on
the grounds of laches. But citing Bradley, the arbitrator required notice be
given to all employees, 150 of whom 57 were represented by one counsel and
one appeared on his own behalf. The union's argument that the costs due to
the protracted length of the proceedings, in large part attributable to the par-ticipation of 58 individual employees, should be shared among all 'parties'
was rejected. Because the collective agreement was silent regarding costs for
or against a third party, and because the OLRA only provided for costs
against the union and employer, it was held that the fees for the hearings over
many months fell on the union and company alone.' 5 '
Arbitrators, then, have split on the notice requirement in policy grievances. That is, almost as many cases have lacked the notice provision, mandatory under the Hoogendoorn rule, as have followed it. Even where notice

140 Unreported, 1976 (Beatty).

Unreported, 1971 (Lane).
1975 (Shime).
140 Unreported, 1973 (Andrews).
150 The prejudice requirement consisted of the loss of fringe benefits by those employees if required to join the bargaining unit.
151 The latter, however, usually has the resources to endure such litigation. For
the union, the possibility of costs on this scale could well necessitate the abandonment
of the grievance.
'47

148 Unreported,
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was given, the arbitrators have seldom enunciated reasons for so doing. The
impression remains that although arbitrators feel bound by the audi alteram
partem rule, or do not wish to risk reversal on judicial review, there is little
enthusiasm for discussing a principle which, to many, appears anomolous in
labour arbitration.
7.

Individual Grievances

Whatever the differences between the dicta in Hoogendoorn and Bradley
as regards policy grievances, both cases held that notice was required in individual grievances, that is, where any success for the grievor directly affected
another individual employee. Since a Supreme Court decision is binding in
subsequent arbitrations, it would be expected that a statistical survey of notice
in later arbitral awards would reflect the Hoogendoorn rule.
TABLE 3

Notified
Not Notified

A.

B.

Seniority Upward

Seniority Downward

110
72

20
12

Yet the data indicate a remarkable resistance by arbitrators to assimilating the
common law notice principle. In category A, involving the 'upward' exercise
of seniority rights, i.e., alleged wrongful promotion, notice was not given to
the incumbent in 39.6 per cent of such cases. In category B, dealing with
'downward seniority' (including reliance on seniority rights to permit bumping, prior recall, etc.), 37.5 per cent of the arbitrations ignored the notice
requirement.
Overall, in just under 40 per cent of over 200 arbitrations where the
effect on an identifiable employee was 'direct', and potentially involved loss
of certain employment benefits should the grievance be upheld, notice was
lacking.1a2
Arbitrators did attempt to justify the lack of notice in some instances by
arguing that the case did not involve a 'competition' between employees for
benefits. This notion stemmed from the Court of Appeal comment in Bradley
that the audi alteram partem rule applied only where individual employees
were in 'competition' for benefits and the union was put to an election as to
whom it would support. The reasoning went as follows: if a new employee
152
While it is possible that in some instances arbitrators may have verbally enquired
as to notice and not reflected this in the award, it is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly,
such an assumption would not explain the reference to the notice issue in other similar
cases by the same arbitrator. Secondly, one would presume that, as lack of proper
notice constituted grounds for reversal on review, the arbitrator, if he had been satisfied
on the notice issue, would have included some reference to the fact that the Court's
ruling had been followed.
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were hired to fill the post, or if the seniority clause only demanded that the
grievor satisfy the job requirements (rather than be rated more highly than
other applicants), there would be really no 'competition' between employees
covered by the collective agreement. The rule in Hoogendoorn, then, did not
apply. Even granting this exception to the Hoogendoorn rule (it must be
confessed that the argument is not compelling, as the interests of another
individual would still be detrimentally affected), only 9 of the 'no notice'
awards spoke to this issue.
TABLE 4
A

Notice Given (Seniority Upward)

Brown
Palmer
O'Shea
Weiler
Shime
B

21
13
9
7
6

Hinnegan
Curtis
Rayner
Egan
Weatherill

4
4
4
4
1

Total: 73 of 110

Notice Given (Seniority Downward)

Brown
Hinnegan
Schiff

6
3
2

Weatherill
Palmer

2
1
Total: 14 of 20

C No Notice Given (Seniority Upward)

Weatherill
O'Shea
Brown
Shime
Palmer

19
19
7
3
3

Roberts
Hinnegan
Egan
Rayner
Schiff

3
2
2
2
1

Total: 61 of 72

D No Notice Given (Seniority Downward)

Brown
O'Shea
Weatherill

3
1
1

Egan
Curtis

1
1
Total:

7 of 12

Table 4 indicates the number of arbitral awards rendered by specific
arbitrators in each category. It must be pointed out that, to some extent, the
results reflect increased arbitral caseloads. However, some observations are
in order. The arbitrators most carefully following the Hoogendoorn rule include Brown, Palmer, Hinnegan and Shime with notice: no notice ratios of
27:10, 14:3, 7:2 and 6:3, respectively. Two arbitrators, namely Weatherill
and O'Shea, often disregard the common law notice rule, with ratios of 3:20
and 9:20, respectively. Yet it must be said that these two individuals are
among the most respected and sought-after arbitrators.
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TABLE 5
Notice

No Notice
Year

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

Seniority Up

Seniority Down

Seniority Up

Seniority Down

-

1

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

-

1

7
12
10
8
19
16

-

-

-

1
3
11
28
19
19
27
1

4
2
2
1
2

-

1
3
9
3
2
2
-

20
12
110
72
Table 5 represents the number of grievances by year in each category.
The data are far from conclusive but there seems to be a general trend away
from compliance with the notice provisions. That is, the figures in column A
are increasing somewhat and those in column C decreasing. Complete figures
for 1976 and 1977 are needed to assess whether the 27 notice cases in 1975
represent an aberration, i.e., whether as more time elapses since the Hoogendoom decision, arbitrators will more freely depart from its dicta.
TABLE 6
Result of Grievance

Denied
Upheld
Other

No Notice

63
15
6

Notice

90
30
10

130
84
Total
Table 6 indicates the disposition of the grievance by category. 'Denied'
and 'upheld' are self-explanatory; 'other' for the most part includes such
orders as remitting the matter to the company for reconsideration. What is
obvious from the statistics is that remarkably few grievances alleging wrongful
promotion or other infringement of seniority rights succeed. Excluding the
'other' category, only 22.5 per cent of such grievances were upheld; this figure
drops to 19.2 per cent of grievances where no notice was given to the incumbent. 153 Thus, arbitrators who disagreed with the court's imposition of the
common law notice requirements could refuse to follow the ruling and yet be
unlikely to be upbraided by the court on judicial review. The 'affected' employee whose promotion had been confirmed by the arbitral award but who
had not received notice would be unlikely to reopen the issue on a procedural
point. As the union is under a duty to notify employees who may be affected
153 Only the highest scoring in each category were selected, although the results
were given for arbitrators in all categories once a high score had been obtained, to
illustrate contrast.
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by the outcome of the grievance, the union cannot take advantage of its own
omission and obtain judicial review on this ground. Therefore, the possibility
of court review is limited to under 20 per cent of such grievances. 15 4
This figure is likely further reduced because of constraints on the incumbent. If the employee is also a member of the bargaining unit, he will
probably be unwilling to challenge the union openly by invoking the judicial
review procedure, since it is to that body that he must turn for protection
against breach of the collective agreement by the employer. It is not a matter
of fear of reprisal but of loyalty and recognition, that his economic security
and employment benefits depend upon union strength.
TABLE 7
Seniority Upward

SeniorityDownward

Overall

10 (50%)
4 (20%)
6 (30%)

50.8%
21.5%
27.7%

56 (50.9%)
24 (21.8%)
30 (27.3%)

Not Attend
Attend
Participate

20

110

Notice

TABLE 8
Not Attend

Year

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

1
1
3
5
18
10
6
11
1

Seniority Upward
Attend

4
5
5
4
6
-

Participate

2
5
4
9
10
-

Table 7 deals with those grievances where notice was given in both
categories, but breaks down the figures according to the response of the affected employee. Table 8 further reduces the data to a yearly basis. The meaning of the 'not attend' group is readily apparent. But the phrases 'attend' and
'participate' need a word of explanation. The response was classified as 'attend' if the individual presented himself at the hearing. 'Participate' included
additional indication of involvement in the proceedings. Because, however,
reference to the action of the affected employee was often oblique, discretion
was exercised in favouring a positive response. That is, indications that the
employee testified were interpreted as 'attend'; any hint that the employee
'represented himself' or asked questions was counted as 'participate'.
In approximately half of the grievances where notice was given, the
affected employees did not even appear at the hearing. Apparently, there is
154

Where notice is given, 25 per cent of grievances are upheld.
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considerable reluctance on the part of employees to become embroiled in what
is seen as essentially a partisan proceeding between the union and the employer. The psychological constraints inhibiting an individual from challenging an arbitral award by way of judicial review also operate to restrict individual participation as a party to the proceedings. This aspect of the Bradley
rule was suggested in Re Toronto Electric Commissioners:1 55 "The practical
implications of the Bradley decision may, therefore, be negligible; if this case
is any indication, there may be very little interest amongst employees in engaging in controversy with their bargaining agent."'156 It should also be noted
that in only 10 of the 30 'participation' cases is there clear evidence of active
involvement, such as retention of counsel, examination of witnesses, or submission of argument. In another 5 instances, there was reference to the employee 'appearing on his own behalf' without further comment. Thus, halving
the figure of 30 would probably be more indicative of the frequency of
serious intervention by the affected individual.
The right to participate as a party may be waived by the employee. But
only two instances of waiver have emerged so far. In Re ConsolidatedBathurst
Packaging,57 an executed statement acknowledging receipt of the notice of
hearing, including the employee's right to be represented by counsel and participate as a party, and waiving such rights, was tendered in evidence. In Re
Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists,5 8 the successful applicant waived his right to intervene in the proceedings. While the practice
of obtaining a waiver from an affected employee may be more prevalent than
the Table indicates, one would expect such action to be reflected in the award,
either to show compliance with the Court's ruling or to demonstrate the inadequacy of the notice requirement.
One final point deserves mention. In Table 8, 19 of the 30 instances of
participation occurred in 1974 and 1975. This figure may not represent a
trend toward increased individual involvement in arbitration; data for later
years are needed to justify this inference. But it should be remembered that
the past few years have witnessed increased dissatisfaction with union leaders
by the rank and file. Wildcatting and non-ratification of collective agreements
represent two means of expressing such discontent. Increased employee intervention in arbitration hearings where individual rights are at issue may well
be another. Should the incidence of participation rise significantly, labour arbitration would certainly be affected. Procedures would need revision to deal
with a multi-party hearing (e.g., cost liability, evidentiary rules, etc.). But
more important, the nature and purpose of arbitration would be squarely put
in issue. For the foundation of the collective bargaining regime - the exclusive authority of the union to represent employees in the bargaining unit would be destroyed, if at arbitration the affected employee(s), (and presumably the grievor) were permitted to intervene as of right. The intention
of the OLRA to substitute a collective agreement for individual contracts of
employment would be thwarted.
155 (1967), 19 L.A.C. 75 (Arthurs).
15 6Id. at 83.

157 Unreported, 1975 (Gorsky).
158 Unreported, 1970 (Weiler).
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Individual grievances are definitely within the scope of the Hoogendoorn
rule. Yet in almost 40 per cent of such cases, notice was not given, in defiance of the court's ruling. Even in the instances of compliance with the common law notice requirement, the issue was virtually ignored. It is a simple inference that arbitrators disagreed with the court on this matter, and chose to
disobey or quietly endure judicial intervention.
8.

Conclusion
Only two instances of judicial review on the narrow point of denial of
natural justice for failure to comply with the audi alteram partem rule were
unearthed.
In Re J.A. Wotherspoon & Son Ltd.,0 9 Addy, J. quashed one of two
arbitration awards (plus that part of a third award dealing with compensation
in the quashed decision) for error of law on the face of the record; the collective agreement had been given an interpretation which it could not reasonably bear. But apart from this, the award would have been quashed and
remitted for reconsideration for lack of proper notice. The arbitrator had
treated as res judicata an earlier interpretation of the collective agreement
before determining the merits of the grievance at the hearing at which those
served with notice were present. In the opinion of the judge:
It is completely improper for any tribunal, where a person is entitled to appear
and be represented on the issue before it, to first of all, without such person
having been notified, decide in his absence a basic question such as the interpretation of an agreement on which that person's rights later will be decided, without
affording him an opportunity to appear and be heard on that fundamental matter. 1 60

The court, therefore, followed Hoogendoorn, holding that where an issue involves the interpretation of the collective agreement, it cannot be decided until
proper notice has been given to those individuals who might be affected by the
outcome. Although Bradley is the case cited, the court glosses over the notion
implicit in the Court of Appeal's judgment that policy matters, such as collective agreement interpretation, are within the purview of the union and
employer alone. 1 61
The other instance of judicial review dramatically illustrates the futility
and inappropriateness of the common law notice doctrine. In Re Western
Freight& OverlandExpress,0 2 the issue involved the merger of two companies
with the consequent problem of integrating both seniority lists. The new
company had under-estimated its staffing requirements and had to recall addiIN (1972), 20.R. 154.
160 Id. at 162.
101 It should be mentioned that the court refused to quash the other arbitration
award involved for lack of notice in that it was only the company, who had not requested affected employees receive notice at the original hearing, which was attacking
the decision. That is, while the award might well be voidable as against affected employees who were denied proper notice, the decision was valid both jurisdictionally and
on the merits as against the union and the company who were present.
162 Unreported, 1972 (Brandt).
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tional employees from the original pool of workers. The difficulty concerned
the seniority entitlement of those men, for the lists had been integrated only
for those men kept on at the time of merger. The arbitrator ordered the entire seniority lists dovetailed; employees already at work were to remain on
the job, but as men were recalled from layoff, they would receive seniority
according to the master list. The court quashed the award on February 18,
1972 for denial of natural justice as the affected employees had not received
notice of their right to intervene. At a second hearing the parties, all represented by counsel, included the union, the company, the five grievors, and seven
of the affected employees. The second award reached the same conclusion
on the basis of the same reasoning, in much the same language, as in the first
decision. Reversal on judicial review did not result in justice for the affected
employees because the first decision had not been unjust. The intervention
of several affected employees raised no new issues or argument. What the
court did accomplish, though, was to significantly increase the costs to be
borne by the company and the union and to delay the resolution of the collective agreement dispute for four months.
In creating a collective bargaining regime designed to achieve industrial
peace, the legislature focussed on the creation of countervailing power blocs.
Through the union, the individual employee would gain economic strength.
The laissez faire era had passed - and with it the notion that a man selling
his labour for wages could hope to achieve a fair return for his work. The
weakness of negotiating an individual contract of employment was to be replaced by the strength of collective bargaining with a union controlling the
supply of labour. The cost of buttressing the union's position was restriction
of the theoretical individual freedom of contract in the labour relations context. The negotiation of the collective agreement and the arbitration process
to resolve disputes under the collective agreement were entrusted to the union
as exclusive representative for the employees in the bargaining unit. Without
doubt, injustice to some individuals seeking enforcement of their employment
rights has occurred. But this must be weighed against the deleterious effects
on the collective bargaining regime if the union were no longer entrusted with
the processing of grievances on behalf of employees and the 'parties' were
expanded beyond the union and the employer.
The judiciary, however, has not comprehended the spirit of labour legislation. Its emphasis has continued to be on the rights of individuals. However
commendable the doctrine of natural justice may be in the administrative law
field, it is unwholesome in labour arbitration. The audi alteram partem rule
serves to escalate costs, delay dispute resolution, and render arbitration proceedings unwieldy. But Hoogendoorn is a clear statement of the courts' fidelity to the common law notice requirement, irrespective of the context.
What is surprising is the extent of the disregard for a ruling of the highest
court in the land. As indicated earlier, in 50 per cent of policy grievances and
roughly 40 per cent of individual grievances, the arbitrators ignored the
Hoogendoorn dicta. Further, there seems to be little point to the exercise required by the judiciary, when over 50 per cent of those receiving notice did
not even attend the arbitration hearing. Only 27 per cent of such affected
employees participated in the proceedings; this figure dropped to 9 per cent
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when participation was restricted to retention of counsel, examination of witnesses, and submission of argument.
The courts, though, are still enamoured of the notice doctrine, as illustrated by the two instances of judicial review. The matter has reached a stalemate: the courts do not wish to revise the notice rule and the arbitrators are
resisting its application. Predictions are hazardous at best, but several observations may be noted. First, it is likely that the Hoogendoorn rule will be increasingly disregarded over time. Further, because of the remote possibility
of judicial review on this narrow ground, the courts will have little opportunity
of enforcing their views. Provided that the rates of active participation by
individuals in arbitral proceedings do not drastically increase, third party
intervention, although troublesome and costly, will not seriously undermine
the functioning of grievance arbitration. Finaly, arbitrators are likely to
continue to refrain from discussing the Hoogendoorn dicta; even where notice
is given, reasons for so doing are almost invariably passed over in silence.
This is one area where ignoring the problem may bring about its elimination.
C. HOAR TRANSPORT. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
A collective agreement has been termed a unique document in that,
while it represents the agreement of two parties - the union and the employer - it creates substantive benefits for third parties - the employees.
The agreement is unique in another sense as well; it is a contract and the
product of negotiation, but statutory obligations are superimposed upon the
free will of the parties with regard to the contents of the agreement. 1 s Considerable difficulty has arisen over the integration of the doctrine of contractual freedom and the statutory requirement in s. 37(1) of the OLRA that
arbitration be the obligatory means of resolving disputes under the collective
agreement. Does the statutory obligation to adjudicate differences through an
arbitral process necessarily create an arbitral jurisdiction and authority immune from modification by the parties to the collective agreement?
The authority implicit in the mandate to reach a 'final and binding settlement' has been discussed in Section A from the point of view of the remedial
authority of the arbitrator - his power to fashion the remedy appropriate to
the collective agreement violation. This section examines the issue of arbitral
control over the process of arbitration.
The OLRA merely requires the arbitration of disputes; the arbitral procedure - indeed, any grievance stage prior to arbitration - is seemingly
103 For example, the collective agreement must run for a minimum term of one
year under s. 44(1); the union security provision in the first collective agreement is
somewhat restricted under s. 38(4); the agreement must contain a prohibition against
strikes and lockouts during the term of the contract under s. 36; and the agreement must
contain a recognition clause that the union is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees in the bargaining unit under s. 35(1). Of course, the parties retain considerable freedom to negotiate as to wages, hours, seniority and other such matters.
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within the control of the parties. 16 4 It is usual for collective agreements to
specify several levels of the grievance process involving various representatives of the parties in an effort to settle the matter prior to arbitration. The
parties almost invariably stipulate that the grievance is to be handled within
definite time limits. The question then becomes, does "the import conveyed by
an agreed resort to final and binding arbitration' '165 include an arbitral authority to modify the procedure of the grievance and arbitration process to insure
effective adjudication?
1.

Arbitral Authority Prior to Hoar Transport

The issue in theoretical terms was the conflict between arbitral obedience
to the provisions of the collective agreement, as an expression of the will of
the parties, and the institutional imperatives of the arbitration process as a
vehicle for dispute adjudication. In practice, however, the question focussed
on breaches of the time limits set out down in the grievance procedure. Did
the violation of such a limitation period bar resort to arbitration, or could
the arbitrator relieve against technical breaches in the interest of resolving the
dispute on the merits? It must be remembered that the limitation periods in
many collective agreements were extremely brief, usually a matter of a few
days, and statutory policy supported such speedy resolution of grievances; arbitration rather than the more cumbersome court process was selected for its
ability to reach determinations quickly. Further, collective agreements often
contained a specific penalty for the violation of the limitation period, i.e. the
grievance was deemed abandoned. Most collective agreements contained a
standard "no alter, amend, or modify" clause. In determining the scope of
arbitral authority to relieve against technical breaches of the collective agreement, arbitrators faced the general restriction in the "no alter, amend or
modify" clause and, often, a specific term indicating the intention of the parties
as to the disposition of the grievance.
Arbitrators developed several approaches to these issues. One approach
was founded on s. 86 (now s. 103) of the OLRA:
No proceedings under this Act are invalid by reason of any defect of form or any
technical irregularity and no such proceedings shall be quashed or set aside if no
substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.

The arbitrator in Re Toronto Parking Authority'66 contended that s. 86 extended arbitral authority beyond that flowing from the express provisions of
the collective agreement, The function of grievance arbitration was to replace
economic force with reasoned adjudication and negotiation; this necessitated
an informal flexibility rather than a literal compliance with procedural provisions in the collective agreement. Only actual prejudice to a party would
164 Arbitral procedure does not here refer to such questions as the order of proceedings, or the admissibility of evidence, etc.; i.e. those matters determined by the
arbitrator at the hearing. Rather, such procedural issues as the time within which one
party must notify the other of its intention to proceed to arbitration, select an impartial
chairman, etc. are referred to as being 'controlled' by the parties.
6
1 5 Supra, note 17 at 60.
166 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 37 (Arthurs).
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justify invalidating a "proceeding under this Act" - phraseology interpreted
as including procedural requirements antecedent to the constitution of the
arbitration board. Therefore, arbitral authority was extended to cover the prior
grievance procedure. Irregularities in that procedure, including breaches of
the time limits, could not operate to bar the right conferred under s. 37(1)
to have disputes resolved by arbitration.
This s. 86 argument was followed in Re Union Carbide Ltd.167 and Re
Hoar Transport Co. Ltd. 0 8 The arbitrator contended that the grievance process, including provisions barring access to arbitration, should be considered
"proceedings under this Act" and, thus, subject to the arbitrator's authority to
relieve against technical irregularities. To hold otherwise would result in the
deemed dismissal of grievances for violation of a limitation period without an
adjudication on the merits. Yet the legislative policy of industrial peace required resolution of grievances on the merits to avoid employee frustration
with a collective bargaining regime which prohibited strikes during the term
of the collective agreement. The right to have differences arbitrated under
s. 37 (1) would be rendered nugatory if the grievance procedure were beyond
the reach of arbitral authority to alleviate against the harsh consequences of a
technical breach of the grievance or arbitration procedure.
Arbitrators, however, were far from unanimous on the issue. This analysis was rejected in Re Canada Decorating and Painting Co. Ltd.169 and Re
Northern Electric Co. Ltd. 70 in favour of contract doctrines governing arbitral authority. That is, the arbitrators considered themselves bound by the
terms of the collective agreement.
Other arbitrators focussed on the distinction between mandatory and
directory provisions in the grievance procedure. As expressed in Re City of
Toronto,' 71 a "mandatory" provision operated to preempt arbitral jurisdiction
to determine the grievance on the merits, whereas "directory" stipulations permitted consideration of the grievance subject to "substantial compliance" with
the collective agreement and actual prejudice to the innocent party. The test
employed to distinguish between the two types of clauses centered on the inclusion or exclusion of a specific penalty for breach of the limitation period.
Where a specific penalty was provided, the clause was considered "mandatory";
where the collective agreement was silent as to the consequences of the breach,
the provision was "directory". This analysis was adopted in Re City of Hanilton 72 to hold that once the provision was declared directory, the merits of
the grievance alleging unjust discharge could be determined.
(1967), 18 L.A.C. 74 (Weiler).
168 Unreported, 1967 (Weiler) .
169 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 325 (Thomas).
107

(1967), 17 L.A.C. 367 (Kennedy).
It should be noted that O'Shea in Re City of Toronto (1967), 19 L.A.C. at 1920 rejected the approach in Re Toronto Parking Authority: "S. 86 of the Act is directed
to the Courts which might otherwise have power to quash or set aside a proceeding
under the Act where there has been a defect of form or a technical irregularity even
if no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred."
172 (1967), 18 L.A.C. 96 (Hanrahan).
170

171
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A directory time limitation provision, however, did not guarantee adjudication on the merits. The grievance must still be brought within a reasonable
time period. Unreasonable delay by one party would preclude determination
on the merits of the grievance regardless of compliance with the stipulation
as to time in the grievance procedure.1 73 The arbitrator's power to dismiss
dormant grievances was said to rest not on the technical equitable doctrines
of the courts, but on labour relations criteria, where amicable labour-management relations depended upon a speedy resolution of grievances.' 7 4
The courts appeared to recognize the authority of the arbitrator to determine whether a grievance should be barred on the grounds of laches or unreasonable delay even if there were no violation of the express terms of the
collective agreement as to a limitation period. In fact, the failure of the arbitrator to consider the circumstances of the grievance and assess the effect of
the delay would result in the quashing of the award on judicial review on the
grounds of abnegation of jurisdiction. 75
The concept of a "continuing grievance" was developed to side-step the
issue of arbitral authority to modify procedural provisions in the collective
agreement. If the dispute were characterized as a continuing grievance, the
limitation period ran only from the time of the most recent breach of the agreement. Although the claim for damages might be time-barred, a grievance
could still be determined on the merits provided the period between the most
recent violation of the agreement and the initiation of the grievance or arbitration process complied with the time limits. The mandatory-directory distinction was irrelevant to the adjudication of such a grievance. 176 It should also
be noted that time did not run until the aggrieved party became aware, or
should have become aware, of the facts founding the grievance. 177
Arbitrators looked to the substance rather than the form of the grievance.
For example, an arbitrator refused to hear a "group grievance" where the
matter should properly have been brought as an individual grievance; the
mandatory time limits applying to individual grievances had expired whereas
the provisions for processing group grievances were merely directory. 178
For arbitrators, the provisions of the collective agreement as to the time
limits for processing grievances were relevant. However, breach of these
limits would not result in the automatic dismissal of the grievance if one party
had explicitly or implicitly condoned the violation, or if that party were not
entitled in fairness to rely on the breach. The doctrines of waiver and estoppel,
17 3

Re Shipping Federation of Canada Inc. (1967), 18 L.A.C. 174 (Weatherill).
18 L.A.C. 50 (Arthurs).
175 Ottawa Newspaper Guild, Local 205 and Bower v. The Ottawa Citizen (1965),
174 Re Dow Chemical of Canada Ltd. (1966),
66 C.L.L.C. at 14,108 (Gale).
176Re

Daal Specialties (1967), 18 L.A.C. 141 (Weatherill).

177 Id.
178 Re

R. G. Dibble Co. Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 293 (Weatherill).
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then, were utilized by17arbitrators to justify a modification of the terms of the
collective agreement.
Arbitrators were attempting to integrate a respect for the integrity of the
collective agreement and the imperatives of an arbitral regime of dispute adjudication - a regime based on both statutory policy and the collective
agreement itself. Familiar with the context of collective bargaining and the
negotiation of such contracts, arbitrators sensed the danger of a literal reading
of the collective agreement. A time limit intended to provide a rapid resolution of rights disputes would be transformed into a device to thwart the very
purpose of the process should a "technical" breach occur. The analogy to the
court's authority under the Rules of Practice to enlarge or abridge time limits
where appropriate (R. 178) and to relieve against formal objections to secure
the advancement of justice (R. 185) was recognized. 80 To be sure, opinions
on the breadth of arbitral power to relieve against such "technical" breaches
were not unanimous, but arbitral jurisprudence on the issue was emerging.
2.

The Rule in Hoar Transport

The issues in Hoar Transport and its companion case, Union Carbide,
were similar. In the former, the union nominee was out of time in requesting
the Minister of Labour to name a chairman for the arbitration board. In the
latter, the union delivered notice of its intention to proceed to arbitration outside the limit provided in the collective agreement.
The arbitrator in Union Carbide adopted the reasoning in Re Toronto
Parking Authority1 s ' that arbitral authority to cure "defects of form" or
"technical irregularities" was grounded in s. 86 of the Act and extended to
pre-arbitration proceedings. The statutory requirement of arbitration of disputes and the collective agreement provision as to the arbitration of differences
founded arbitral authority to control the process of arbitration to the extent
of ensuring the resolution of grievances on the merits, subject to other arbitral
doctrines such as waiver or unreasonable delay.
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, decisively rejected this approach
in favour of a strict application of contract doctrine. The authority of the arbitrator was to be determined by the wording of the collective agreement; the
arbitrator had no inherent jurisdiction to modify the terms of that agreement.
In Union Carbide, the Court held that s. 86 of the OLRA merely prevented
the courts from quashing arbitral proceedings for technical irregularities on
to be governed by the "plain and emphatic
judicial review; the arbitrator was' 82
language of the written contract."'
170 Supra, note 176; Re Northern Telephone Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 86 (Weatherill); St. Catherines Public Utilities Commission (1969), 20 L.A.C. 78 (Weatherill);
Re Crane Canada Ltd., unreported, 1969 (Andrews).
180 Union Carbide (Can.) Ltd. v. Weiler, [1968] S.C.R. 966; 70 D.L.R. (2d) 333
at 77-79, rev'g sub. nom. R. v. Weiler; Ex parte Union Carbide (Can.) Ltd., [1968] 1
O.R. 59; 65 D.L.R. (2d) 412.
181 Re Toronto Parking Authority (1966), 17 L.A.C. 37 (Arthurs).
82
1 Supra, note 180 at 336.
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The Court in Hoar Transport cited its decisions in Union Carbide and
Port Arthur Shipbuilding as binding, and reiterated that the collective bargaining regime was to be governed by contract doctrines:
The board of arbitration is bound by the terms of the collective agreement.
Article 6.7 and 6.8 [re: time limits] are integral provisions of the agreement.
They create obligations of a basic nature and the parties to the agreements are
obliged to adhere to them. The board of arbitration cannot ignore or dilute the
force of these
obligations, nor change their purport by means of amendment or
18
substitution. 3

A full analysis of the judgments in Union Carbide and Hoar Transport
is not intended; the primary focus here is on the effect of the court's reasoning on subsequent arbitrations. A few points deserve mention, however. In
Hoar Transport, the Court approved the reasoning in the Court of Appeal.
There, Aylesworth, J.A. concluded that there was no merit in the submission
that the failure to adhere to the time limit was a mere technical irregularity
within s. 86 of the OLRA:
These provisions are an integral substantive part of the agreement vital to its
orderly operation. To dismiss the failure here of observation thereof as a 'technical
irregularity' is to destroy the very intent, operation and effect of the procedure
negotiated with respect to grievances.1 84

Yet there is no indication of either the "very intent" of the parties in negotiating the grievance procedure, or the possible effect of the relevant statute beyond a recitation of sections in the OLRA and the collective agreement.
Further, Aylesworth, J.A. states that
the utterly untenable reasoning that the obligations imposed by art. 6.7 of the
agreement are merely 'directory' or that non-compliance therewith is merely a
respecting any
'technical irregularity' is as completely fallacious as so to hold
other of the substantive provisions throughout the agreement.' 8 5

The Court also ignored a contractual doctrine raised by the arbitrator

that
there is substantial authority for the proposition that, as a matter of contract law,
penalties provided for breaches of contract, which do not involve a legitimate
attempt to pre-estimate liquidated damages, are unenforceable (Shatilla v. Feinstein (1923), 3 D.L.R. 1035). In substance the 'deemed withdrawal of the grievance' is a penalty or sanction for a breach of contract which is otherwise
remediable in money damages.186

Nor did the court deal with the possibility of statutory illegality. If the
purpose of the OLRA is to promote industrial peace through the arbitration
of disputes under the collective agreement, contractual provisions purporting
to preclude the operation of the statute and prevent the arbitration of unset183 Supra, note 16 at 450-51.
184 R. v. Weiler; Ex parte Hoar Transport Co. Ltd., [1968] 1 O.R. 705 at 709; 67

D.L.R. (2d) 484 at 488 rev'g., [1967] 2 O.R. 554; 64 D.L.R. (2d) 400. Aftd. (Sub.
nom. GeneralTruck Drivers Union v. Hoar Transport Co.), [1969] S.C.R. 634; 4 D.L.R.
(3d) 449.
185 Id. at 710 and 489.
186 Re Hoar TransportLtd., unreported, 1968 (Weiler).
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be declared contrary to public policy and severable
tled grievances should
87
from the contract.1
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hoar Transport was
handed down in April, 1969. Along with Union Carbide, the decision constituted clear judicial authority for two related propositions, namely, that the
parties to a collective agreement were entirely free to construct a binding
grievance procedure, including a penalty provision precluding resort to arbitration, and that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to relieve against the
harshness of that penalty, irrespective of the circumstances.
The Arbitral Response: The Mandatory-DirectoryAnalysis
Judicial decree, however, did not ensure arbitral obeisance. Arbitrators
were quick to seize upon the distinction between mandatory and directory
time limits in the grievance procedure to circumscribe the reach of the Court's
judgments. The court had declared the limits in Hoar Transport as mandatory
by implication; it had dismissed the notion that the collective agreement provision was merely directory. Arbitrators, then, while acknowledging the authority
of the judicial interpretation, could contend the decision did not affect truly
"directory" provisions.
3.

The analyses in Re Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. 88 and Union Carbide
Canada Ltd. 89 laid down the test: if the collective agreement provided for a
specific penalty for each of the time limits in the grievance procedure, then
those limits were considered mandatory; in the absence of such penalty and
despite the use of the imperative 'shall' in the relevant clause, the provision
could be declared directory and thereby justify a hearing on the merits. 190
This approach proved quite popular, and was followed in approximately twenty
unreported decisions.' 9 '
However, while arbitrators expressly stated that a classification of time
limits as directory finessed the court's reasoning in Hoar Transport, proof of
187 See, D. M. Beatty, Procedural Irregularities in Grievance Arbitration (1974),
20 McGill L.J. 378 at 492, wherein the author contends that the scope of s. 36 (prohibiting the right to strike during the term of the collective agreement) and s. 37
(the arbitration clause) are coextensive and really constitute a quid pro quo: 'To the
extent that the union's freedom to strike has been eliminated, its right to arbitration
should be ensured. Thus when faced with procedural provisions, the breach of which
would otherwise deny the board's jurisdiction, the arbitrator must give effect to s. 37
and resolve the differences on their merits."
188 (1969), 20 L.A.C. 319 (Shime).
189 (1968), 19 L.A.C. 412 (O'Shea).
100 But, see, Re Maison Mere des Soeurs de la Charite d'Ottawa (1973), 3 L.A.C.
(2d) 392 (Beatty) for a finding of a directory time limit notwithstanding the use of the
imperative "shall."
10
1 Re Dunham-Bush Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Brown); Re Union Carbide Canada
Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Hinnegan); Re Mutual Electric Co. Ltd., unreported, 1975
(Ord); Re Dominion Consolidated Truck Lines Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Fox); Re Janin
Building and Civil Works Ltd., unreported, 1970 (O'Shea); Re John Inglis Co., unre-

ported, 1974 (Weatherill); Re Atikokan General Hospital,unreported, 1974 (Aggarwal);
Re William Neilson Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Curtis); Arlington Crane Service Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Weiler); Re Weston Bakeries Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Gargrave).
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actual prejudice to the innocent party would nonetheless bar a hearing on the
merits. 19 2 Arbitrators drew some fine distinctions to retain jurisdiction under
this analysis. In Re Eldorado Nuclear Ltd.,19 the collective agreement was
held only to be directory at the stage where the breach occurred, although
"clearly" mandatory for the subsequent steps in the grievance procedure. In
Re Grey Mixing Equipment Ltd.,194 the collective agreement stated that the
nominee should select a chairman within seven days but also provided for a
Ministerial appointment if the nominees failed to agree. The arbitrator held
both stipulations rendered the time limits directory and, further, as there was
no evidence that the nominee had failed to "agree" on the chairman (as distinct from "notification of their agreement"), arbitral jurisdiction existed.
Finally, mutual fault in selecting a chairman, coupled with the absence
of a penalty provision, grounded arbitral jurisdiction in Re Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Ltd.195 The reasoning is interesting, in that a duty to select a
chairman was imposed on both parties in order to preclude one party from
relying on the time limits to prevent a hearing on the merits. 196
A variation on the mandatory-directory analysis looked to the form of
the grievance. That is, if the collective agreement could be taken to refer to
individual grievances, arbitrators held that the s. 37(2) of the Act incorporated a directory arbitration clause in the collective agreement applicable to
union or policy grievances. When faced with a mandatory provision in the
collective agreement concerning individual grievances, arbitrators refused to
infer that the parties intended such language to govern policy grievances.
Under s. 37(2) of the Act, an arbitration provision is deemed part of the
collective agreement if the contract omits such a clause. This section specifies
time limits for the completion of various steps in the arbitration process but
does not contain a penalty for breach of the limitation period. Policy grievances,
therefore, were considered grounded by the statutory provision; as this clause
was directory, the rule in Hoar Transportwas inapplicable. 197
Unfortunately, the directory analysis was severely limited in scope. This
semantic device to circumvent Hoar Transportwas relatively impotent in the
face of a penalty provision for breach of the time limits. 198
192 Re Ault Milk Products Ltd., unreported, 1970 (Simmons); Re Consumers' Gas
Co., unreported, 1972 (Lysyk); Re Alsteel Fabrications (Sudbury) Ltd., unreported,
1971 (Godin); Re Kelsey-Hayes Canada Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Rayner); Re Noront
Steel Construction Ltd., unreported, 1970 (O'Shea).
193 Unreported, 1971 (Hanrahan).
'94 Unreported, 1973 (O'Shea).
195 Unreported, 1971 (Ord).

19 6 The decision implicitly relies on estoppel; it would be unfair to permit a party
in default of its own procedural obligations under the collective agreement to rely on a
procedural breach by the other party to bar a resort to arbitration.
197Re Sylvania Electric Canada Ltd. (1972), 24 L.A.C. 361 (Simmons); Re
Thames Valley Ambulance Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Fox).
198 Of course, it was open to the parties to alter the arbitration clause by deleting
the penalty, thus rendering the provision directory. However, as the clause most often
worked to the advantage of the company, the change would require the bargaining

away of another benefit by the union. Negotiation, then, could not adequately redress
the effect of the Court's judgment.
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UnreasonableDelay

Where limits were found to be directory, arbitrators continued to elaborate the notion of "reasonableness" as the only compelling limitation on their
199
jurisdiction to adjudicate grievances on the merits. Re Shipping Federation
formed the touchstone of this doctrine: a hearing must be fair to both parties.
Prejudice by reason of unjustifiable delay precluded such fairness because
witnesses' recollections faded, documents were destroyed, etc. 200 In Re Canadian Industries Ltd.,201 the arbitrator held that in view of company expenses
incurred in training the successful job applicant, a five month delay by the
union was sufficiently unreasonable to bar arbitration despite directory time
limits. However, in another promotion grievance, the arbitrator refused to
consider a six month delay unreasonable, perhaps because the union nominee
had attempted to contact his counterpart and the message had been inadvertently mislaid. 202 Where prejudice was not established, however, delay was
often held to be not unreasonable. 203 The unreported decisions tended to
204
follow similar patterns.
Reasonableness was held to be a function of the circumstances; in Re
Sault Ste. Marie Board of Education,20 5 the arbitrator excused a delay of
three years due to the secrecy of the hiring. When the union became apprised
of the facts, the grievance was processed with all due dispatch.
The consensus seemed to be that collective bargaining implicitly required
a speedy settlement of grievances regardless of whether the collective agreement spoke directly to the matter of time limits. 20 6 Actions by either party
which violated the spirit of dispute adjudication should preclude access to
grievance arbitration.
100 (1967), 18 L.A.C. 174 (Weatherill).
200 Re Ottawa Citizen (1969), 20 L.A.C. 27 (Weatherill); Re Honeywell Controls

Ltd. (1971), 22 L.A.C. 310 (Hinnegan).
201 (1970), 21 L.A.C. 136 (Metzler).
202 Re Union Gas Co. of Canada Ltd. (1971), 23 L.A.C. 83 (Brown).
203

Re International Nickel Co. of CanadaLtd. (1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 120 (Sim-

mons); Re Hydro-ElectricCommission of the Borough of North York (1974), 6 L.A.C.
(2d) 113 (Carter); Re Canadian Industries (1969), 20 L.A.C. 386 (Palmer).
204
For example, substantial compliance with the grievance procedure was held
necessary and a nineteen-month delay unreasonable in Re Noront Steel Construction
Co. Ltd., unreported, 1970 (O'Shea); a six-month delay constituted prejudice to the
company, which had specifically extended the time limits on several other grievances
after negotiation, in Re B.A.S.F. Wyandotte Corp., unreported, 1974 (Brandt); two
years was a patently unreasonable delay in Re Atlas Steel Co., unreported, 1972 (Brandt);
serious financial liability was prejudicial to the employer in Re Hydro-Electric Power
Commission of Ontario, unreported, 1971 (Fine) and Re Savarin Tavern, unreported,
1972 (Weatherill). Where prejudice was absent, however, the grievances were adjudicated, as in Re Douglas Aircraft, unreported, 1972 (Reville) and Re Governing Council
of the University of Toronto, unreported, 1975 (Adell).
205 Unreported, 1975 (Godin).
200 Re Abitibi Paper Co., unreported, 1973 (Palmer).
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The Continuing Grievance

Another 'device' to avoid the rule in Hoar Transport was the doctrine
of continuing grievances. If the gravamen of the complaint related to a repetitive or continuing breach of the collective agreement, the grievance was considered timely despite the date of the initial breach or the first filing of the
grievance; each fresh infringement founded a new legal claim. 207 The concept
was attractive in that it sidestepped the effect of a mandatory provision in the
collective agreement as to the time limits for processing the grievance. 208
Compensation, however, was retroactive only for the limitation period stipulated in the collective agreement so that the innocent party's financial burden
would not have been increased by the defaulting party.20 9
Most commonly, the subject matter appropriate for classification as a
continuing grievance was the deduction of union dues in the form of a policy
grievance.2 10 But a continuing grievance was also found in Re A. Schonbek
& Co. Ltd.,2 11 where the grievance was held to relate to the continuing employment of an employee at a lower wage rate and classification, rather than
the return to work at that lower rate. The use of non-union labourers while
union members were on layoff was considered a repetitive violation, to avoid
the mandatory language of the collective agreement regarding time limits,
in Re City of Toronto.212 In Re Bendix Automotive of Canada Ltd.,213 an
entitlement to sickness and accident benefits was likewise deemed a repetitive
violation.
Obviously, the utility of the device was a function of the range of breaches
which could be found to have a continuing nature. In Re Dominion Glass Co.
Ltd.,214 the concept was seriously restricted by the holding that a continuing
grievance could only be found where there were repeated violations of the
collective agreement rather than a single instance which produced "continuing
effects." In that case, an alleged improper assignment of work outside the
bargaining unit was considered a single violation of the collective agreement
and, given the mandatory phrasing of the limitation period, the grievance was
207

Re Triangle Conduit and Cable CanadaLtd. (1968), 21 L.A.C. 332 (Weiler).

20SRe United Aircraft of Canada Ltd. (1970),

21 L.A.C. 64 (Curtis); Re John

Inglis Co. Ltd., unreported, 1974 (Weatherill); Re Lustro Steel Products Co. (1971),
22 L.A.C. 294 (Weatherill); Re Beacon Hill Lodges of Canada Ltd., unreported, 1974
(MeCullogh).
209 Re R.C.A. Victor Co., unreported, 1970 (Weiler); Re Hart and Cooley Manufacturing Co. Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Rayner); Re Automatic Screw Machine Products

Ltd. (1972), 23 L.A.C. 396 (Johnston); Re Parking Authority of Toronto (1974), 5
L.A.C. (2d) 150 (Adell).
210 Re Graves Foods Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Aggarwal); Re Blue Mountain Pottery (1973), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 215 (Johnston); Re Lustro Steel Products Co., supra, note
208.
211 (1966), 18 L.A.C. 30 (Lande).
212 (1974), 7 L.A.C. (2d) 53 (Simmons).

213 (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 21 (Weatherill).
214 (1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 151 (Reville).
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dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On review, 215 Lacourciere, J. reversed the
arbitrator. (The decision was subsequently cited as authority for an arbitrator's classification of a seniority calculation as a continuing grievance in Re
6
Maison Mre des Soeurs de la Charitg d'Ottawa.21 ) However, the Ontario

Court of Appeal later restored Revile's award, thereby upholding a narrow
218

2 17
The arbitrators in Re Atlas Steels Ltd.
construction of the doctrine.
and Re Ralph Milrod Metal Products Ltd.2 1 9 considered themselves bound by

the court's judgment. Thus, judicial review of Re Dominion Glass emasculated
the concept of a continuing grievance as a means of alleviating the harshness
of mandatory limits.

6.

Arbitral Obedience

By far the most common response to HoarTransport and Union Carbide
was a perfunctory application of the Court's ruling. If the language was man220
From
datory, the grievance was dismissed without a hearing on the merits.
221
manner.
this
in
1969 to 1975, over 50 cases were 'adjudicated'
Unfortunately, the constant repetition of the rule in Hoar Transport
215 [1973] 2 O.R. 573; 34 D.L.R. (3d) 629 (DC) rev'd (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 408;
40 D.L.R. (3d) 496; 74 C.L.L.C. 14,203 (sub. nom. Dominion Glass Co. v. United
Glass & Ceramic Workers) 5 L.A.C. (2d) 224.
210 (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 392 (Beatty).
217 [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 408 (CA); 40 D.L.R. (3d) 496, 74 C.L.L.C. 14,203 (sub.
nom. Dominion Glass Co. v. United Glass & Ceramic Workers), 5 L.A.C. (2d) 224;
rev'g, [1973] 2 O.R. 573; 34 D.L.R. (3d) 629 (C.A.).
218 (1974), 7 L.A.C. (2d) 24 (Rayner).
210 Unreported, 1975 (Schiff).
22 0
Re Union Carbide Canada Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 74 (Adell), Re Ottawa
General Hospital (1970), 21 L.A.C. 135 (Palmer).
221 Re Windsor Utilities Commission (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 359 (Krever); Re
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, unreported, 1972 (Reville); Re W. C. Norris
Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Brown); Re Welland Canal Twinning Project ContractorsAssociation, unreported, 1973 (Brown); Re Motor Transport Industrial Relations Bureau of
Ontario, unreported, 1973 (Brown); Re Labatt's Ontario Breweries Ltd. (1972) 1
L.A.C. (2d) 443 (O'Shea); Re Alcan Canada Products Ltd., unreported, 1974 (Weatherill); Re Toronto Construction Association, unreported, 1973 (Brown); Re Mutual
Dairies Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Lysyk); Re General Hospital of Port Arthur, unreported, 1973 (Aggarwal); Re Gidon Industries Inc., unreported, 1973 (Brown); Re
Steel Co., unreported, 1974 (Gorsky); Re Steel Co. of Canada Ltd., unreported, 1974
(Brown); Re Steinberg'sLtd., (1970), 21 L.A.C. 137 (Hanrahan); Re National Grocer's
Co. Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Lang); Re Newman Structural Steel Ltd., unreported, 1973
(Falzetta); Re Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Weatheril); Re
Canadian Acme Screw & Gear Co., unreported, 1970 (Weiler); Re Douglas Aircraft,
unreported, 1973 (Weatherill); Re Dravo of Canada Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Brown);
Re St. Thomas Elgin General Hospital, unreported, 1971 (Christie); Re North York
General Hospital, unreported, 1970 (O'Shea); Re Northern Electric, unreported, 1970
(Simmons); Re Sola Basic Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Brown); Re St. Joseph Hospital,
unreported, 1972 (Falzetta); Re Industrial Fasteners Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Aden);
Re Regional Municipality of Hamilton Wentworth, unreported, 1974 (Krever); Re
McKinlay Transport Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Palmer); Re Consumer's Gas Co., unreported, 1972 (Brown); Re Letter Carrier'sUnion of Canada,unreported, 1974 (Fraser);
Re Kendan Manufacturing Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Brandt); Re Bestpipe Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Andrews); Re Standard Brands Canada Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Brown).
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seemed to inhibit arbitral creativity; when arbitrators were confronted with
fact situations where the rule might have been 'bent', opportunities were
passed over. For example, where in the past the company had waived time
limits and the evidence was conflicting on waiver in the instant case, the
arbitrator held that lack of proof of a written or specific verbal assurance
resulted in an absence of jurisdiction.22 In Re Construction Products IncorpY= the arbitrator accepted the company's testimony as to an oral objection to timeliness even though a written objection was not raised before the
hearing. Where the collective agreement required a written waiver but the
company did not raise an objection as to timeliness until the hearing, the contractual provision governed and the preliminary objection as to timeliness
succeeded. 224 That the union, alleging discriminatory discipline, only learned
of the lesser penalties to others at a later date was irrelevant; the arbitrator
held that the fairness of the penalty was solely a function of the facts at the
time the discipline was imposed, 25 The date of mailing of the disciplinary
discharge, not that of its receipt, was considered critical in determining time
a delay in the Rural Route delivery of the registered letter to
limits, despite
226
the grievor.
It can be concluded that, once a limitation period was found to be mandatory, many arbitrators evinced considerable reluctance to use other arbitral
doctrines to relieve against the harshness of the rule in Hoar Transport.227
Some cases were truly tragic on the facts. For example, in Re Lake Ontario Steel Co. Ltd., the grievor had requested a leave of absence because of
serious marital difficulties, and the company granted one week. The shock
from the death of the grievor's infant child during that week resulted in the
grievor overstaying the leave - and his dismissal. The grievance was filed
citing Union Carbide
out of time and the limitation period was mandatory; 228
as determinative the arbitrator dismissed the grievance.
Thus, many arbitrators felt bound to follow the Court's ruling in Hoar
Transport, despite recognition that a literal interpretation of the collective
agreement as regards the grievance procedure229often operated to thwart the
arbitral resolution of grievances on the merits.
7.

Waiver
The Courts in Hoar Transport and Union Carbide had not commented
on the prerogative of the parties to waive rights under the collective agree222

22

Re Haley Industries Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Brown).

3 Unreported, 1972 (Brown).

Re National Steel Car Corp. Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Weatherill).
Re Barber-Ellisof Canada Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Palmer).
226 Re Alcan Canada Products, unreported, 1974 (Brown).
227Re Kelsey-Hayes Canada Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Brandt); Re Emmanuel
Products Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Brown).
228
Unreported, 1973 (O'Shea). See, also, Re Corporation of the City of London,
unreported, 1972 (Brown).
229 Arbitrators also applied the judicial doctrine that failure to exhaust internal
remedies deprived the courts of jurisdiction to hear a grievance: Re Bomar Steel Co.
Ltd., unreported, 1975 (O'Shea).
224
225
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ment. In view of judicial silence on the issue, arbitrators applied the earlier
jurisprudence. Despite strong mandatory language, the time limits in the collective agreement could therefore be "waived" by the innocent party; arbitral
authority to determine the grievance on the merits would not be restricted by
the terms of the collective agreement.
Waiver could be either express or implied from the circumstances. Waiver
was said to be implied where the company had failed to raise the objection
as to timeliness as soon as reasonably possible after the breach occurred. 230
If the innocent party treats the grievdnce on the merits at any stage in the
procedure after violation of the time limits, the defect was considered to be
impliedly waived.2 3' The innocent party, of course, could take such steps expressly "without prejudice" to the alleged procedural objection; the doctrine
of waiver would not apply in such circumstances.
In the case of Re Regency Towers Hotel,2 2 the arbitrator summarized
the doctrine of waiver. His reasoning, often cited by other arbitrators, established two applications of the doctrine: where the objecting party has induced
the other to rely on a representation that the procedural requirement need not
be satisfied (sometimes termed estoppel or promissory estoppel) and where
the objecting party further processed the grievance on the merits before men-

tioning the procedural defect.233 In Re DouglasAircraft Co. of CanadaLtd.,23 4
the arbitrator relied on the doctrine to find the company estopped, during a
two week plant shutdown, from asserting that the time limits were running,
23o Re Stratford General Hospital Corp., unreported, 1973 (Weatherill); Re Long
Sault Fabrics, unreported, 1970 (Weatherill); Re Iron Works Co., unreported, 1971
(Weatherill); Re Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Rayner); Re
Purolater Products (Canada)Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Rayner); Re G.S.W. Appliances
Ltd., unreported, 1974 (Brown); Re Town of Pembroke (1967), 18 L.A.C. 125 (Johnston); Re C.GE. Co. Ltd., unreported, 1973 (O'Shea); Re Douglas Aircraft Co. of
Canada, unreported, 1970 (Christie) one of two grievances; Re Falconbridge Nickel
Mines Ltd. (1973), 2 L.A.C. (2d) 195 (Rayner); Re Janin Building and Civil Works
Ltd., unreported, 1970 (O'Shea).
The objection as to timeliness, however, could be raised by implication: in Re
Liquid Carbonic CanadianCorp. Ltd., (1971), 23 L.A.C. (Rayner), the arbitrator held
that the company had "inferentially" raised the issue of timeliness; one could not expect
precise legal verbiage early in the grievance procedure. See, also, Re Construction
Products Inc. (1970), 22 L.A.C. 125 (Brown), in which oral notice by the company
was deemed sufficient to inform the union of its timeliness objection, although the
arbitrator commented that good industrial practice would require confirmation in writing.
231 Re C.N.R. Telecommunications Department, unreported, 1971 (Arthurs); Re
W. C. Norris Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Brown); Re Automatic Screw Machine Co.
(1970), 21 L.A.C. 255 (Shime); Re C.N.R. Telecommunications Department, unreported, 1973 (Curtis); Re U.S.W.A., unreported, 1972 (Weiler); Re Sunar Industries
Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Weiler); Re Brown Forest Industries Ltd., (1969), 20 L.A.C.
76 (O'Shea).
232 (1973), 4 L.A.C. (2d) 440 (Schiff).
233 See, Re Canada Building Materials Co., unreported, 1973 (Gorsky) where the
arbitrator, after reviewing the arguments raised in Regency Towers, held that case's
reasoning to be inapplicable to the facts of the instant grievance; contrast this with Re
Inglis Ltd. (1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 288 (Johnston) where, after citing the Regency
Towers case, the arbitrator did find factual evidence of waiver.
234 Unreported, 1970 (Christie).
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because there had been innocent misrepresentation in that the personnel department had indicated to the employee that the grievance could not be filed
during the shutdown.
Waiver has less often been found to be express. In a very few instances, the
company expressly agreed to waive its right to object to timeliness in order to
permit determination of the grievance on the merits.6 Rarely, both parties
may be found to have waived all time limits and preliminary steps to quickly
adjudicate the grievance.236
Surprisingly, arbitrators have often been unwilling to find waiver in the
238
absence of a clear evidence. 237 In Re Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto,
the arbitrator warned that the facts must conclusively indicate that one party
intended to relinquish its rights under the collective agreement. Furthermore,
evidence of earlier waiver by the company did not preclude its right to object
to a subsequent breach of the time limits. 239 In Re Union Gas Co. of Canada
Ltd.,240 it was held that waiver as to timeliness did not include a waiver as to
the extent of compensation.
There was a distinct advantage to finding that waiver had occurred as a
matter of fact. On review, the court would be bound by the arbitrator's holding unless there was no evidence to substantiate the conclusion. 241 It is surprising that waiver was not found in a number of cases where the facts showed
sufficient confusion surrounding the processing of the grievance to give the
union the benefit of the doubt. 24 - It must be remembered that a finding of
waiver cannot settle the grievance, but only allows its adjudication on the
merits. It may be, however, that some arbitrators persuaded the company to
withdraw its preliminary objection if they felt there were mitigating circumstances, but did not record this in their judgments. There is some tangible
23
5 Re Corporation of the Borough of North York, unreported, 1974 (Simmons);
Re Livingstone Industries Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Shime); Re Spruce Falls Power &
Paper,unreported, 1973 (Simmons).
236 Re Coulter Manufacturing Co. Ltd., unreported, 1972 (Weatherill). That the
parties intended to extend time limits was found on the facts in Re Plummer Memorial
Public Hospital, unreported, 1974 (O'Shea) and in the case of a signed waiver agreement in Re Northern Electric Co. Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Gorsky).
237
Re Sperry Gyroscope, unreported, 1975 (Roberts); Re Board of Park Management & Sarnia Arena and Community Centre, unreported, 1974 (Brown).
238 (1974), 5 L.A.C. (2d) 311 (Coulter).
239
Re A.C. & S. ContractingLtd., unreported 1974, (Dunn) and Re Ontario Steel
Products Ltd., unreported, 1971 (Palmer).
240 (1972), 2 L.A.C. (2d) 45 (Weatherill).
241 Labour Relations Board v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 46; 107 C.C.C.
75; [1953] 3 D.L.R. 641, rev'g 7 W.W.R. (N.S.) 145 and restoring 6 W.W.R. (N.S.)
510; [1952] 3 D.L.R. 855. The court dismissed an application for judicial review in
Re Parking Authority of Toronto and Toronto Civic Employees' Union (1974), 4 O.R.
(2d) 45, 47 D.L.R. (3d) 40 (D.C.), holding that where the arbitrator (reported at
(1974), 5 L.A.C. (2d) 150 (Adell)) had found as a fact that neither element essential
for the doctrine of laches (i.e., acquiescence in the sense of an awareness that one's
legal rights were being violated and detrimental reliance by the other party) had been
proven, there was no error in law in failing to apply the doctrine.
242
Supra, notes 217 to 222.
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evidence that this may have occurred in some of the cases. 243 Further, the
company may have decided unilaterally that the raising of a preliminary
objection as to timeliness would more likely generate employee frustration
(and increase the risk of economic retaliation) than result in a loss on'a
determination on the merits. In this event, the arbitration award would be
completely silent on the issue.
8.

Other ArbitralMeans of Avoiding the Rule in HoarTransport

Arbitrators did continue to rely on pre-Hoar Transport arbitral jurisprudence to avoid the automatic dismissal of the grievance for breach of
limitation periods. The doctrine of estoppel was applied to prohibit one party,
where its actions were culpable to some degree, from relying on the breach of
time limits by the other. For example, the default of one party at some stage
in the grievance process could not thwart the innocent party's right to arbi244
tration.
In some instances, arbitrators avoided the consequences of the mandatory language in the collective agreement by defining the calculation of the
time period to which the agreement referred. For example, in a grievance
alleging improper payment of a travelling allowance, time was held to run
from the date the employee received his paycheque, not the date the cheque
was posted; the grievance accordingly fell within the limitation period.2 5 In
Re Moffats Ltd.,24 6 in holding that time did not begin to run until the date the
grievor became aware of the collective agreement violation, the arbitrator
recognized the realities of the employment circumstances: the grievor had
been transferred to another location and had not learned that another employee had been recalled from lay-off at the main plant until some time had
passed. Where the chairman withdrew because of a conflict of interest, it was
held that the steps in
the grievance procedure must be retraced with refer47
ence to time limits. 2
243 For example, in Re Galt Metal Industries Ltd., unreported, 1973 (Lysyk), the
company withdrew its objection at the hearing, and in Re National Grocers Co. Ltd.,
unreported, 1974 (Palmer), the company likewise dropped its preliminary objection.
After indicating orally that he would rule against the preliminary objection as to timeliness on the grounds of substantial compliance with the grievance procedure, the arbitrator in Re Elite Sportswear Manufacturing Ltd., unreported, 1974 (Arthurs) persuaded
the company to withdraw its objection.
2 44
Re Gabriel of Canada Ltd. (1970), 21 L.A.C. 72 (Brown); Re Canada Building Materials Ltd. (1970), 21 L.A.C. 140 (Brown); Re Harry Woods Transport Ltd.,
unreported, 1973 (Fox); Re Libby, McNeill & Libby of CanadaLtd., unreported, 1973
(Simmons); Re Federal Drilling Supplies, unreported, 1971 (Lowney); Re Fabricated
Metal & Stampings Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Beatty).
245 Re Dominion Stores Ltd., unreported, 1975 (Curtis).
240 Unreported, 1971 (Egan).
247
Re Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, unreported, 1972 (Rayner). The arbitrator also applied the analogy of the doctrine of frustration of contract, i.e., the withdrawal of the chairman frustrated the performance of the arbitration board's function.
Neither party was to be permitted to obtain any benefit (i.e., the right to rely on the
breach of the time limits in constituting a new board) as the failure to arbitrate the
grievance was not the fault of either party.
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In Re O.S.F. Industries Ltd.,24s the arbitrator held that since the grievance should be dismissed on the merits, it was unnecessary to deal with the
preliminary objection that the grievance had not been processed properly. In
effect, the arbitrator ignored the rule in Hoar Transport and adjudicated the
grievance on the merits. This useful procedure would not be difficult to follow,
since arbitrators often receive all the evidence at the hearing while reserving
their ruling on the preliminary objection as to timeliness. Indication that the
grievance would not have succeeded on the merits in any event would have
a considerable salutory effect since, in those instances, union frustration at the
failure of arbitration to resolve disputes under the collective agreement would
be lessened. Further, such a practice might well encourage the arbitrator to
rely on other arbitral doctrines to avoid the rule where he felt the grievance
would succeed on the merits.
In some cases where a preliminary objection as to timeliness was raised,
arbitrators based their authority to resolve grievances on a combination of
reasons; the collective agreement provisions would be found directory, the
grievance characterized as continuing, and the company found to have waived
its rights in any event. Obviously, arbitrators hoped that, on review, one of
the "pegs" might stick to prevent the quashing of the award. 249
9.

Continued JudicialReview
Another factor which probably inhibited arbitral creativity was the omnipresent possibility of judicial review. In Re Automatic Screw Machine Products Ltd.,250 the court held that the arbitrator had declined jurisdiction by not
first determining a "collateral" issue, namely whether the grievance, signed by
twelve employees, had been properly processed as a group grievance, and the
case was ordered remitted to an arbitration board, preferaby one differently
constituted, for reconsideration. The arbitrator had held that while the langnage was not clearly mandatory, and although he doubted that the provision
could be construed as directory, he was satisfied that the company had waived
its rights to object to untimeliness by considering the grievance on the merits.
The company referred to the limitation period in an earlier letter but the arbitrator did not conclude that the company had thereby reserved its right to
refuse to consider the grievance. 251 The reasoning demonstrated a liberal view
of waiver, intended to permit a determination on the merits - and was overturned. In Re Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, the arbitrator had carefully scrutinized the collective agreement and held that the provision requiring
the application for a ministerial appointment of a chairman within fifty days
was directory, that is, the imperative "shall" was not conclusive, and the
Ministerial request could be separated from the other steps in the grievance
248
24 9

Unreported, 1972 (Brown).

Re Janim Building and Civil Works Ltd., supra, note 226; Re Erie Iron Works

Co., supra, note 226; Re Mutual Electric Co. Ltd., supra, note 187.
250 [1971] 3 O.R. 30.
251The grievance had been upheld on the merits: see, (1970), 21 L.A.C. 255

(Shime). Further, it should be noted that part of the arbitrator's award, dealing with
the admission of extrinsic evidence, (i.e., the past practice of the company reguiding
lunch breaks) was also quashed as an error of law.
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procedure which were subject to a penalty clause.2-52 However, the decision
was quashed upon application for judicial review. The court merely reiterated
the rule that an arbitrator must not modify nor dilute the force of the provilimitation
sions in the collective agreement by substituting a "reasonable"
25
period and held that the clause was clearly mandatory.
These reminders of the attitude of the judiciary - that "creative" arbitral jurisprudence would face a hostile reception in the courts - undoubtedly
repressed efforts to minimize the effect of Hoar Transport.
10. Legislative Intervention
Some stories do have happy endings. As early as 1968, a number of
arbitrators expressed their concern that several judicial decisions, including
Hoar Transport, had jeopardized the future of labour arbitration. In July,
1975, s. 37(5a) of the OLRA was enacted:
Except where a collective agreement states that this subsection does not apply, an
arbitrator or arbitration board may extend the time for the taking of any steps in
the grievance procedure under a collective agreement, notwithstanding the expira-

tion of such time, where the arbitrator or arbitration board is satisfied that there
and that the opposite party will not be
are reasonable grounds for the extension254
substantially prejudiced by the extension.

As yet, the section has not been the subject of judicial interpretation.
However, the wording seems broad enough to nullify the effect of the judicial
decisions in Hoar Transport and Union Carbide. The section operates unless
there are express words in the collective agreement to the contrary - and,
realistically, it should prove exceedingly difficult for an employer to negotiate
the inclusion of such a non obstante clause. The authority of the arbitrator to
relieve against breaches of time limits is comprehensive - applying to "any
steps" in the grievance procedure. There is a suggestion of vindication in the
test adopted, i.e., "reasonable grounds for the extension" subject to substantial prejudice to the other party, the very criteria the arbitrators had used
where escape from the harshness of Hoar Transporthad been possible.
In PlasticapLtd.,255 the new amendment was considered by an arbitrator. In that case the union was 21 days beyond the five days stipulated as
binding in the collective agreement. The arbitrator held that the mandatorydirectory analysis was irrelevant and where, as here, there was no prejudice
to the employer, the limits should be extended under s. 37(5a). He further
decided that the amendment applied despite the fact that grievance proceedings were initiated prior to the enactment; s. 37 (5a) was held to be an excep252 (1973),

3 L.A.C. (2d) 126 (Schiff).

[1974] 3 O.R. (2d) 180. The court also held that s. 37(4) of the OLRA, authorizing the Minister of Labour to appoint an arbitrator where the parties failed to agree
on a chairman, did not empower the Minister to relieve against the terms of the collective agreement.
254 S.O. 1975, c. 76.
255 Unreported, 1975 (Simmons).
253
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tion to the general rule that legislation is prospective in operation,2 56since the
section was clearly remedial and affected only "procedural" rights.
With the enactment of s. 37 (5a), the crisis posed by Hoar Transporthas
become moot. There is now specific statutory authority for arbitrators to do
what many felt had always been a necessary implication of the OLRA: to
adjudicate grievances on the merits subject to "substantial compliance" with
the grievance procedure and the absence of prejudice.
E.

CONCLUSION

It has become clear over the past fifteen years that the courts have abandoned their earlier characterization of the collective bargaining regime as the
outcast of the legal system; but while the instances of judicial intervention
have increased, the hostility of the courts toward collective bargaining, with
few exceptions, has continued. The judiciary has declared arbitration boards
to be subject to judicial review as are other statutory tribunals; it is unlikely
that increasingly
complex privative clauses will successfully oust this jurisdic2 57
tion.
But it is urged that subjection to judicial review need not have a deleterious effect on the operation of arbitration as a means of dispute settlement
under the collective agreement. It is the attitude with which that review has
been undertaken that presents the threat. Courts have refused to treat labour
arbitration as a structure for dispute resolution that is conceptually different
from judicial adjudication. To be sure, arbitral jurisprudence borrows heavily
from such common law doctrines of contract as waiver. This similarity, however, should not mask the significant differences: acceptability of the arbitrator
and the award as the touchstone of arbitration; the arbitrator's remedies, particularly specific performance; the informality, speed and flexibility of the process; the absence of stare decisis amongst arbitral decisions; the expertise developed through familiarity with the issues in the labour relations field. Finally, it must be stressed that labour arbitration is not an hierarchical, uniform
system; arbitration boards are ad hoc bodies determining grievances under a
256 The arbitrator considered the limitation period in the collective agreement to
convey only "procedural" rights, notwithstanding the conclusion of the Court in Hoar
Transport and Union Carbide, that such terms constituted "substantive" provisions of
the contract.
He also discussed the same section in Re Covertite (Ontario), Ltd., unreported,
1975 (Simmons), citing the reasoning in his earlier award. However, as the employer
did not pursue its preliminary objection as to timeliness, a definite ruling was not needed.
2 57
The B.C. Labour Code, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122 as amended by S.B.C. 1975, c. 84,
which purports to oust judicial authority to review arbitral decisions in almost all cases
(see, especially ss. 32, 33, 34), has yet to be judicially considered. But the Supreme
Court of Canada has repeatedly stressed its inherent authority to review arbitration
boards as statutory tribunals. It is argued that an "effective" privative clause depends
more on the tolerance of the courts for pluralism in dispute settlement than on legal

draftsmanship. But, see, Pringle v. Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821; 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28, rev'g

(sub. nom. Re Fraserand Pringle), [19711 2 O.R. 749; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 129; for a recent
indication that the courts may be prepared to recognize the legislative intent of privative
clauses.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 14, No. 3

specific collective agreement, albeit with reference to "industrial jurisprudence".
Port Arthur Shipbuilding, Hoogendoorn and Hoar Transport graphically
illustrate the danger of judicial review where arbitration is considered simply
as an adjunct to the existing hierarchy of the courts. In Port Arthur Shipbuilding and Hoar Transport, the Court denied the arbitrator any implicit
power on the basis of the arbitration clause to settle collective agreement disputes; his authority was derived from, and defined by, the express terms of
the collective agreement. The arbitrator's mandate to reach a final and binding resolution of any differences arising under the collective agreement was
not seen as implicitly conveying arbitral authority to fashion the appropriate
remedy (as in PortArthur Shipbuilding) or to control the arbitration process
(including the grievance procedure) in order to ensure adjudication on the
merits (as in Hoar Transport). In Hoogendoorn, the Court refused to countenance the suggestion that natural justice as defined by the common law may
not have universal application. The judiciary failed to acknowledge that the
substantive rights of individuals in the employment context were ephemeral
until the advent of the collective bargaining regime, or that the rights of the
individual under a collective bargaining system are preserved by the duty of
fair representation imposed on the union. The individual's terms of employment are negotiated by his exclusive representative, the union, and enforced
by that body, but the individual retains a right to participate in the activities
of the union and be represented without discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious practices by his designate. But the individual employee in the bargaining
unit does not have a right to negotiate a separate contract of employment, to
participate as an individual employee in settling the collective agreement, or
to enforce his rights under the collective agreement except under union auspices, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract. The Court did not indicate
the substantive rights of the individual to which the procedural requirements
of natural justice attached.
The difficulty has been not merely that the courts have disagreed with
the arbitrators' reasoning or implicit premises about collective bargaining, but
that the judicial decisions have constituted a superficial reaffirmation of the
common law doctrines without an analysis of the exigencies of the system
onto which the common law is sought to be imposed. As Paul Weiler has said:
The trouble with absentee management by judges, though, is that they are not
familiar with these implications of what they are doing and that they will not
usually be troubled later on by what they have done. Yet, their authoritative
force may have consequences
statement is in the reported opinion, and its intrusive
8
far different than were intended by the Court.05

The consequence in Port Arthur was the overturning of the established
arbitral jurisprudence as to the authority of the arbitrator to modify an unreasonable penalty imposed by management. In Hoogendoorn, the result was
the imposition of an unworkable notice requirement in arbitration proceedings
and the right to participate as a party for all individuals "affected by the out258 Supra, note 8 at 66. The comment specifically referred to the Port Arthur Shipbuilding decision, but is equally appropriate to Hoar Transport and Hoogendoorn.
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come" of the grievance, despite their reluctance or inability to use it. Finally,
Hoar Transport required strict adherence to contractual terms concerning
the grievance process, without recognition of the implicit arbitral authority to
relieve against those time limits and determine the substantive issues between
the parties. But, in practical terms, the consequence of the judicial judgments
was the dismissal of grievances or an unwarranted delay in proceedings.
The arbitrators attempted to integrate the judicial pronouncements with
existing, and developing arbitral jurisprudence so as to effect as little destruction as possible. The most successful example of this integration was Port
Arthur Shipbuilding. To be sure, a number of cases could be classified as
"hair shirt" decisions; the arbitrator mechanically applied the Court's holding and accepted all the negative implications for the arbitral system. Yet,
the arbitrators also developed ways of circumventing those dicta. First, they
redefined a number of issues, ranging from the question of the measure of the
discipline imposed, to the fulfilling of an antecedent (and arbitrally imposed)
condition. Of more importance was the elaboration of the "proper" test in
discipline grievances: was the grievance within the reasonable range of responses to the act in question? This phraseology of Weatherill in Re International Nickel2 59 gained wide acceptance, permitting the arbitrator to consider
the entire circumstances of the grievance, including such mitigating factors
as provocation, seniority, and work record. Thus, even before the legislative
amendment, arbitrators had begun to circumscribe the effect of the Court's
intervention.
After Hoogendoorn, the arbitrators, in significant numbers, merely
ignored the Court: of the cases surveyed, fully 40.7 per cent seem not to
have complied with the audi alteram partem rule. What is striking about these
awards is the minimal reference to the judicially imposed rules; the arbitrators
did not even attempt to rationalize the lack of notice. Indeed, even where
notice was given, few arbitrators commented that they did so pursuant to the
Hoogendoorn or Bradley decisions. Noncompliance with the Hoogendoorn
notice rule is likely to increase with time, particularly since the probability of
judicial review on this narrow ground is remote. Therefore, although the
potential harm to arbitration as a result of the Hoogendoorn notice rule is
great, it is unlikely that the threat will materialize. Individuals are subject to
significant restraints in challenging their exclusive bargaining agent for an
independent right of participation in the grievance process because most
realize that their economic security and employment benefits depend upon
union solidarity. As more arbitrators feel free to discard the notice rule,
Hoogendoorn should slowly fade away.
If Port Arthur Shipbuilding represented a relatively successful effort to
contain the judicial dicta, Hoar Transport constituted a virtual failure of arbitral attempts to mitigate the harshness of the Court's ruling. To be sure, the
mandatory-directory analysis was of some help in avoiding the rule, as was
the doctrine of continuing grievances and the technique of redefining the
calculation of the limitation period. But the most common arbitral response
259 See,

Table 6, pp. 82-83.
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was obedience; between 1969 and 1975, over fifty grievances were dismissed
for breach of the limitation period in the grievance procedure. Further, arbitrators refused to fully utilize the doctrines of waiver or estoppel to contain
the judicial rules in Hoar Transport and Union Carbide.
The different reactions of the arbitrators to Port Arthur Shipbuilding and
Hoar Transport is, perhaps, understandable in the light of established arbitral
jurisprudence at the time the decisions were handed down. Arbitrators had
fleshed out the concept of just cause for discipline in the industrial context
and confirmed the remedial authority of the arbitrator to modify penalties
long before the Court intervened. Convinced that that jurisprudence was the
most appropriate for labour arbitration, arbitrators were: prepared to create
a means of circumventing the Court's ruling in order to return to it. Arbitrators, however, had not reached consensus on the issue of arbitral authority
to intervene in the grievance process to enable adjudication on the merits.
Many arbitrators had not accepted the s. 86 argument that arbitrators could
relieve against technical irregularities in the grievance proceedings. The mandatory-directory analysis and the doctrines of continuing grievance and unreasonable delay were approved formulae but did not expressly deal with the
conflict between a legislative mandate to reach a final and binding settlement
and the freedom of the parties to govern their relationship by negotiating a
collective agreement. Thus, arbitrators faced the explicit holdings in Hoar
Transportand Union Carbide without a consensus as to the appropriate jurisprudence to be followed; until statutory amendment, obedience presented fewer
difficulties.
A consequence of the Court's decisions was widespread modification of
the terms of collective agreements. Particularly after Port Arthur Shipbuilding, collective agreements more frequently included an express authorization
that arbitrators could alter the discipline imposed by the company. To a much
lesser extent, after Hoar Transport agreements occasionally deleted the "penalty" provision for breach of the grievance procedure, thereby preserving
arbitral authority to relieve against such breach under the "directory" approach. But it must be stressed that while the parties may have been able to
circumvent the Court's rulings in Hoar Transport and Port Arthur Shipbuilding, there was no assurance that collective agreements would be modified in
all cases. The company had directly benefited from the judiciary's position and
the union was required to bargain away some other advantage to achieve an
alteration. While the inclusion of a clause authorizing the arbitrator to modify
disciplinary penalties was probably worth a strike, the recasting of a limitation
provision in the grievance procedure as directory was unlikely to be of high
priority. Thus, the effect of Port Arthur Shipbuilding was more likely to be
remedied in this fashion than the consequences of Hoar Transport. It should
be recalled that the collective agreement was intended to establish the relationship between the employer and employee, and not to redress difficulties
occasioned by judicial review of arbitration.
A direct consequence of the Court's rulings was the intervention of the
Legislature. In 1970, s. 37(8) was added to the OLRA, empowering the arbitrator to substitute such penalty as seems "just and reasonable in all the
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circumstances." In 1975, the statute was again amended to include s. 37(5a),
whereby the arbitrator may "extend the time for the taking of any step in
the grievance procedure, notwithstanding the expiration of such time", provided the other party has not been prejudiced thereby. Clearly, it is always
open to the Legislature to 'correct' the 'error' of the judiciary by statutory
amendment. However, the process is cumbersome and time-consuming; in the
interim, as in Port Arthur Shipbuilding and Hoar Transport, the instances of
injustice will accumulate. Indeed, such accumulation is often necessary to
convince the Legislature that the problem requires statutory alteration.
It has been suggested that labour arbitration should not be incorporated
into the judicial hierarchy. An alternative approach, which would permit
judicial review but preserve the integrity of arbitral dispute adjudication, is
already familiar to the courts in the conflict of laws context. 260 It is recognized
that to determine the rights of parties without reference to the relevant foreign
law which the parties expected to be applied would not fairly resolve the issue.
Strong arguments support the notion that a collective bargaining regime operates in many respects as a self-contained system just as a foreign country's
legal system is separate and independent. It is contended, then, that the courts
should acknowledge the uniqueness of collective bargaining by viewing arbitration decisions as a product of 'foreign' law. On review, the courts would
apply the 'proper law of the contract', that is, arbitral jurisprudence. This
approach would permit judicial review but restrict judicial intervention to instances where the arbitral jurisprudence was wrongiy applied or where public
policy so required. It must be remembered, also, that such pluralism in judicial
lawmaking is not unfamiliar. Indeed, cases on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada from Quebec are determined according to the Quebec Civil Code
while those from other provinces are determined according to common law.
For the most part, the courts in the 1960's emphatically rejected any notion
of pluralism in the judicial treatment of arbitral awards. But there is some
evidence that the approach may be changing.
In Re Gould Manufacturing of CanadaLtd. and the United Steelworkers
of America, the court refused to apply the common law doctrine of repudiation of contract to the collective bargaining context. 61 Further, the Ontario
Court of Appeal recognized a broader scope for the remedial authority of
the arbitrator in Re Blouin Drywall Contractors Ltd. and United Brother260 For a full discussion of the power of review given the courts under the B.C.
Labour Code, see Arthurs, "The Dullest Bill". Reflections on the Labour Code of British
Columbia (1974), 9 U.B.C. Law Rev. 280 at 319-39.
261 [1973] 2 O.R. 279; 33 D.L.R. (3d) 527 (D.C.). Although a provision in the
collective agreement provided that "nothing in this agreement shall be construed as
waiving any rights or protection to either the Company or the Union under any applicable law", the court held that the employee's intentional misrepresentation did not
justify the employer's repudiation of the collective agreement; the employee was entitled
to the protection of the collective agreement, including the right to grieve his discharge.
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hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 248,262 suggesting that
the judiciary may have altered somewhat the perception of the role and
function of the arbitrator. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada also
seems to have altered its conception of collective bargaining, due, at least in
part, to a change of membership on that body. In McGavin Toastmaster Ltd
v. Ainscough,263 the issue was the entitlement to severance pay of employees
who engaged in an illegal strike when the company subsequently shut down
the plant. Laskin, C.J.C., for the majority, held that the individual contracts
of employment could no longer be said to exist given the labour relations
legislation establishing a collective bargaining regime. Where a collective
agreement has been negotiated pursuant to legislative enactment, it must be
that collective agreement which determines the rights of the parties. It should
be noted, however, that the decision was a 5-4 split; the minority favoured
the doctrine of individual contracts of employment, composed of both the
terms of the collective agreement and the common law. It cannot be said
that the judiciary as a whole has embraced the notion that review of arbitration awards should be conducted any differently than review of other statutory
tribunals.
Until such an attitudinal change does occur, it is argued that judicial
review will continue to approximate an appellate examination of arbitral
awards. The doctrines of exceeding and declining jurisdiction are sufficiently
broad to justify judicial intervention in almost all instances in which the court
disagrees with the arbitrator's result. The instances of specific amendment
of the OLRA to deal with the difficulties created by judicial review of arbitral
awards should afford strong evidence that the judiciary is not dealing with
labour arbitration as the legislature intended.
It can be said, in conclusion, that the development of arbitral jurisprudence has been inhibited by judicial review, and that arbitrators have had to
direct much of their energy toward fashioning devices and doctrines to restrain
the intrusion of inappropriate concepts into grievance arbitration. This waste
(1976), 57 D.L.R. 199; 75 C.L.L.C. 14,295, rev'g (1974), 4 O.R. (2d) 423; 48
(3d)
191 (sub. nom. Re Blouin Drywall ContractorsLtd. and United BrotherD.L.R.
hood of Carpenter's& Joiners of America), 74 C.L.L.C. 14,244 (D.C.). The company
had breached the preferential hiring and hiring hall provisions of the collective agreement by retaining non-union employees to perform bargaining unit work. The court
reversed the Divisional Courts' determination that declaratory relief was the only form
available and reinstated the arbitrator's award of damages, even though this involved
the distribution of monies to union members unemployed during the time the work was
carried out.
In Re Samuel Cooper & Co. and International Ladies' Garment Worker's Union,
[1973] 2 O.R. 841; 35 D.L.R. (3d) 501 (D.C.), the company violated the provisions
of the collective agreement regarding contracting out, union security and certain obligatory payments (e.g. sick benefits, retirement, severance pay and welfare funds). The
arbitrator had ordered damages and had made additional directions akin to mandatory
injunctions to ensure management compliance with its future obligations under the
collective agreement. The court upheld the authority of the arbitrator to fashion such a
remedy as part of the arbitration process; the union was not forced to pursue this
remedy at law.
263 (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) afl'g, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 114; 45 D.L.R. (3d)
687 (B.C.C.A.) 74 C.L.L.C. 15,056 aff'g, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 505; 36 D.L.R. (3d) 309.
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was particularly evident in the Hoar Transportcase. Arbitral jurisprudence at
the time the Court's decision was handed down was unsettled, in that arbitrar
tors had not yet resolved the conflict between the imperatives of an arbitral
system of dispute resolution and the principle of contractual freedom in the
negotiation of collective agreements. Resolution of this important issue was
postponed for six years, until the statutory amendment of 1975.
In any discussion of judicial review of arbitration awards, the function
and role of arbitration must be emphasized. Arbitration is the means sanctioned by the legislature to resolve disputes arising under the collective agreement. The resolution of such disputes on the merits serves to increase employee
acceptance of a collective bargaining regime in which the right to strike
during the term of the collective agreement has been denied. Conversely, the
denial of grievances on technical points or inappropriate doctrines reduces
such acceptance and increases frustration. Thus, the problem posed by judicial review is not simply confined to the development of arbitral jurisprudence
in one direction or another. Rather, the extent to which judicial review inhibits arbitration from fulfilling its function represents the magnitude of the
threat to the system of collective bargaining.

